Criminals Get All the Rights: The Sociolegal Construction of Different Rights to Die by Martin Rountree, Meredith
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 105 | Issue 1 Article 4
Winter 2015
Criminals Get All the Rights: The Sociolegal
Construction of Different Rights to Die
Meredith Martin Rountree
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation




THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 105, No. 1 
Copyright © 2016 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A. 
149 
CRIMINALS GET ALL THE RIGHTS:  
THE SOCIOLEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
DIFFERENT RIGHTS TO DIE 
MEREDITH MARTIN ROUNTREE* 
 
 
In the United States, different people have different rights to die. This 
Article traces the origins of death-sentenced prisoners’ ability to enlist 
assistance in dying and compares it to the considerably more circumscribed 
right held by people with serious illness. It uses empirical research on 
“volunteers,” death-sentenced prisoners who sought execution, to argue 
that the legal standard for adjudicating their requests to hasten execution 
should be changed. Empirical evidence suggests many of the concerns 
governing the regulation of assisted dying in the medical context are 
present in the death row case. This Article therefore urges courts to use a 
balancing test comparable to that developed in cases involving assisted 
dying in the medical context. Further, counsel should be appointed to 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the ink scarcely dry on the Supreme Court’s decision reviving 
capital punishment in the United States,1 Gary Gilmore burst onto the legal 
scene. Gilmore demanded his execution, all but daring the State of Utah to 
kill him. In response to opponents of his execution, Gary Gilmore 
complained: 
You know, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that you have a right to die. I’m talking 
about the Karen Ann Quinlan case. I don’t even really think that enters, if I want to 
press for my civil rights. I could raise issues like that, but I’m not.2 
Since Gary Gilmore’s 1976 execution, over 10% of death-sentenced 
prisoners executed in the United States hastened their own executions.3 This 
Article examines Gilmore’s (and others’) contention that these prisoners 
have a “right” to die, as well as the sociolegal context in which rights to 
hasten death are embedded. Comparing the rights to die of the terminally ill 
and the death-sentenced reveals how historical contingencies, normative 
 
1 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
2 The New Jersey Supreme Court, not the United States Supreme Court, decided the 
Quinlan case in March 1976. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). Gilmore’s reference 
to this case in November 1976, however, reflects its cultural currency at the time he sought 
to be executed. Transcript of November 30, 1976 Utah Board of Pardons Hearing at 12, In re 
Gilmore, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (on file with author). 
3 The Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC) reports 1,389 executions in the modern 
era and identifies 142 “volunteers,” defined as those prisoners who waive available legal 
appeals. Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions (last visited Sept. 19, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/CC4P-5TG8; http://perma.cc/5BG6-ACG7. It excludes, therefore, prisoners who 
pursue legal remedies, but do not seek clemency. It also excludes those prisoners who 
abandoned their appeals at one point, but then changed their minds, regardless of whether the 
courts permitted them to resume their appeals. Margaret Vandiver et al., “Let’s Do It!”: An 
Analysis of Consensual Executions, in THE DEATH PENALTY TODAY 190 (Robert M. Bohm 
ed., 2008). The Winter 2014 edition of Death Row U.S.A., compiled by the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. reported that of the 1,359 individuals executed in the 
modern era, 143 were volunteers, or 10.5%. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., 
DEATH ROW U.S.A. WINTER 2014, at 10 (2014), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/files/
publications/DRUSA_Winter_2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UEN5-JZBB. For a 
discussion of the word “volunteer,” see infra subpart III(B)(3). 
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beliefs, and different legal logics can shape legal responses to demands for 
rights. In this case, the death row prisoner is legally privileged as compared 
to the terminally ill patient. Paradoxically, however, the more expansive 
right held by the death row prisoner reflects and furthers his social 
marginalization. 
Prior scholarship on so-called volunteers has generally taken one of 
two approaches.4 One strand focuses on reforming the legal standards 
governing volunteers. Anthony Casey, as discussed below, argued for 
different standards for waiving appeals depending on the appeal sought to 
be waived.5 John Blume proposed a framework for adjudication that would 
assess possible suicidal motivation and prohibit “unjust” punishments, such 
as the execution of the innocent or those who are categorically excluded 
from the death penalty.6 This scholarship retains the essential conceptual 
model of the criminal law of waiver and the Eighth Amendment death 
penalty framework of heightened reliability. Another thread of scholarship 
has argued for a right to execution, analogizing the death row prisoner 
seeking execution to the terminally ill.7 As explored in greater detail below, 
this latter work has relied on assumptions about the volunteer population 
and how capital law works to argue for a categorical right to execution, 
 
4 G. Richard Strafer’s article, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness 
and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860 (1983), 
represents an exception. His qualified Fourteenth Amendment analysis, however, is not 
informed by more recent legal and empirical developments. 
5 Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An Argument for Restricting a 
Defendant’s Right to Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages in Capital Proceedings, 30 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 75, 101–05 (2002). 
6 John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 939, 967–72 (2005). 
7 See, e.g., Kristen M. Dama, Comment, Redefining a Final Act: The Fourteenth 
Amendment and States’ Obligation to Prevent Death Row Inmates from Volunteering to Be 
Put to Death, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1083, 1101 (2007) (arguing states have no constitutional 
obligation to prevent volunteering for execution); Kathleen L. Johnson, Note, The Death 
Row Right to Die: Suicide or Intimate Decision?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 614–21, 623 
(1981) (asserting that the state’s interests in preserving life, protecting innocent third parties, 
prevention of suicide, and maintaining professional ethics were categorically outweighed by 
prisoner’s fundamental “right to freedom of choice”; therefore “the state’s interest in 
preserving respect for life through careful appellate review of all death sentences should give 
way to the competent prisoner’s right to refuse appeal” so long as the waiver is competently 
made); Julie Levinsohn Milner, Note, Dignity or Death Row: Are Death Row Rights to Die 
Diminished? A Comparison of the Right to Die for the Terminally Ill and the Terminally 
Sentenced, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 279, 336 (1998) (“[T]he death 
row right to die should exist for those inmates for whom a right to die via refusal of life-
sustaining medical treatment would exist if they were terminally ill rather than terminally 
sentenced” so long as prisoner is competent and waives his rights). 
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rather than one that should be subjected to careful, individualized weighing 
of interests. 
This Article supplies a much-needed empirical basis for a critique of 
the waiver model as inadequate and the unqualified Fourteenth Amendment 
right to die as inappropriate. The legal standard for waivers is low and 
problematic, as discussed below. Further, the Fourteenth Amendment right 
to die framework, which balances the state’s interests in the preservation of 
life, prevention of suicide, protection of third parties, and protection of the 
integrity of the medical profession against the individual’s interest in 
autonomy in dying, is relevant to the death row prisoner. Based on recent 
research on the death row population generally and volunteers specifically, 
I propose a standard for death row volunteers that borrows from the medical 
context by requiring the volunteer to persuade the court that his right to die 
outweighs the state’s interests. 
The death row data support the analytic “fit” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment model. Mental health researchers have found a greater 
prevalence of psychological and psychiatric disorders on death row 
generally, and my research suggests that volunteers may be at greater risk 
for suicide. Many, if not most, death row prisoners (including volunteers) 
have ties to third parties. My research also highlights the inability of the 
waiver model to protect the integrity of the legal profession and the legal 
system broadly conceived. Bypassing appeals raises concerns about the 
reliability of the capital punishment system. In addition, observations of 
attorney performance reveal the professional and ethical tensions attorneys 
confront as they represent volunteering clients. 
This Article also goes beyond previous work by tracing the sociolegal 
context in which different rights to die emerged. By contrasting Gary 
Gilmore and Karen Ann Quinlan, historical contemporaries and landmark 
figures in defining modern American rights to die, this Article illuminates 
not only the contradictory ways the law treats the asserted right, but also the 
profoundly different historical and social settings in which these rights 
claims emerged. This Article then urges courts to refocus on the 
fundamental question: when can an individual legally obtain assistance in 
dying? In answering that question for death-sentenced prisoners, courts 
should consider the broader social values that they have traditionally 
weighed in adjudicating requests to hasten death in the medical context. 
Part I of this Article sets out the different legal frameworks for 
adjudicating requests to hasten death among the death-sentenced and the 
sick. Part II describes empirical findings that should inform the central legal 
questions. Part III discusses the historical and cultural context in which the 
law took shape. Part IV proposes an improved legal process that 
incorporates the state’s interests in decisions to hasten death in the medical 
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context into adjudications of death row prisoners’ requests to hasten 
execution. It would also mandate that counsel be appointed to advance the 
state’s interests in opposing the prisoner’s waiver of further appeals. In its 
Conclusion, this Article reflects on some of the larger questions raised by 
this project, including the apparent paradox that the socially powerless 
death row prisoner has a right to assistance in dying where the innocent and 
ill do not. In addition, the death row research reveals the precarity and 
ambiguity of certain legal constructs, such as “voluntary” and “rational,” 
which are central to defining a right to die. 
I. DIFFERENT RIGHTS TO DIE8 
Death-sentenced prisoners vindicate a right to die through a technical 
legal process that, when contrasted with the process used by those with 
serious physical illness, reflects how differently these groups are treated. 
Courts understand that seriously ill people are embedded in a larger social 
world and recognize that their cases present profound questions about death 
and dying. By contrast, for the volunteer, even the most salient concern 
about the legitimacy of a state execution recedes as the court focuses on the 
narrower issues of whether the prisoner is competent to waive his rights to 
appeal and does so knowingly, intelligently, and competently.  
After outlining the death row volunteer’s legal process, this Part 
describes the evolution of rights to die in the medical context. As discussed 
in greater detail below, patients achieved the right to refuse life-sustaining 
medical intervention in most instances, but a right to assistance in dying 
was rejected by the Supreme Court. Certain states responded by authorizing 
assistance in dying under certain very limited circumstances. The Part 
concludes by analogizing the death row volunteer to patients who seek 
assistance in dying.  
A. DEATH-SENTENCED PRISONERS 
1. Process for Hastening Execution 
A death-sentenced prisoner can hasten execution by abandoning his9 
appeals, usually by discharging counsel and electing not to file any 
 
8 Versions of the description of the legal regime governing death row waivers have 
previously appeared in Meredith Martin Rountree, “I’ll Make Them Shoot Me”: Accounts of 
Death-Sentenced Prisoners Advocating for Execution, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 589 (2012) 
[hereinafter “Accounts”] and Meredith Martin Rountree, Volunteers for Execution: 
Directions for Further Research into Grief, Culpability, and Legal Structures, 82 UMKC L. 
REV. 295 (2014) [hereinafter “Directions for Research”]. 
9 While women have been subjected to the death penalty, they constitute only a fraction 
of death row inmates. As of January 1, 2014, sixty women are on death row in the United 
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pleadings on his own behalf. Prisoners typically have three essentially 
sequential avenues of appeals. 
The first appeal is called a “direct appeal,” in which the prisoner 
generally argues to the state’s highest criminal court that the trial judge 
made erroneous legal rulings in the course of the trial. The degree to which 
capital cases are routinely subjected to appellate review may be overstated 
because of the prevalence of statutory provisions characterizing the direct 
appeal as “automatic.”10 The availability of the appellate mechanism does 
not necessarily mean that the direct review cannot be waived. A few states 
prohibit waiver of direct review in capital cases,11 but others permit death-
sentenced prisoners to forgo direct appeal at least in part. These states may 
permit the death-sentenced prisoner to waive his “personal” right to 
appeal12 but still require, e.g., a review dictated by statute. Therefore, 
Washington State requires its Supreme Court to consider whether “there are 
not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency”; whether “the 
sentence . . . is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in 
similar cases”; and whether “the sentence . . . was brought about through 
passion or prejudice.”13 Texas ostensibly requires a direct appeal, but since 
 
States. Thirteen have been executed. By contrast, at last count, 3,010 men are currently on 
death row, and 1,346 have been executed. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., supra 
note 3, at 1, 8. The Death Penalty Information Center reports that 139 death-sentenced men 
and 3 women successfully sought execution. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 3. For 
simplicity, I use the masculine pronoun throughout this Article. 
10 See Johnson, supra note 7, at 578; Milner, supra note 7, at 284–85. 
11 See, e.g., State v. Ovante, 291 P.3d 974, 978 (Ariz. 2013) (en banc); State v. Brewer, 
826 P.2d 783, 790–91 (Ariz. 1992); People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29, 39–41 (Cal. 1998); 
Robertson v. State, 143 So. 3d 907, 908–09 (Fla. 2014); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 
A.2d 174, 180–81 (Pa. 1978). 
12 Newman v. State, 84 S.W.3d 443, 444 (Ark. 2002). 
13 State v. Dodd, 838 P.2d 86, 97–98 (Wash. 1992); see also Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 
1368, 1375 (Del. 1992) (finding complete waiver precluded by state statutory mandate); 
Geary v. State, 977 P.2d 344, 346–47 (Nev. 1999) (“Despite Geary’s valid waiver of his 
appeal, this court must conduct a mandatory review pursuant to . . . [a statute requiring] this 
court to review whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstances, whether the 
death sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary 
factor, and whether the death sentence is excessive, considering the crime and the 
defendant.”); Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802, 808 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (“The sentence 
review, which we have found to be mandatory and not subject to waiver, requires this Court 
to determine whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstances found by the trial 
judge.”); State v. Motts, 707 S.E.2d 804, 811 (S.C. 2011) (“Although Motts is entitled to 
waive his personal right to a direct appeal, we hold that he cannot waive this Court’s 
statutorily-imposed duty to review his capital sentence.”); Patterson v. Commonwealth, 551 
S.E.2d 332, 333 (Va. 2001) (“Although Patterson has waived his right of appeal, Code § 
17.1-313 mandates that we review the imposition of the death sentence. We must consider 
and determine whether the sentence of death was imposed ‘under the influence of passion, 
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor,’ and whether the sentence is ‘excessive or 
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1994, in cases where the volunteer waives direct appeal and discharges 
counsel, the appellate court has proceeded without the benefit of briefing in 
determining whether “fundamental error” marred the trial.14 
The second appeal—variously called a “collateral attack,” 
“postconviction appeal,” or “state habeas proceeding”—provides the 
prisoner an opportunity to argue to the state court that he was deprived of a 
fair trial, not because the trial judge made a legal error, but because of 
events outside the courtroom. These claims typically include evidence of 
ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial suppression of material 
exculpatory evidence. When it had the death penalty, only New Jersey 
prevented prisoners from waiving postconviction appeals in capital cases.15 
The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that the public’s “interest in the 
reliability and integrity of a death sentencing decision . . . transcend[ed] the 
preferences of individual defendants.”16 
The final avenue of appeal essentially combines all federal 
constitutional claims raised on direct appeal and in state habeas 
proceedings. These claims are presented to the federal district court in a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.17 An adverse adjudication by the federal 
district court may, under certain circumstances, be appealed to the federal 
 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the 
defendant.’”). Louisiana requires the appellate court to consider whether the death sentence 
is “excessive” because of a state constitutional provision. State v. Bordelon, 2007-KA-0525, 
p.4 (La. 10/16/09); 33 So. 3d 842, 847. “Excessiveness” is decided based on the influence of 
“arbitrary factors,” and “whether the evidence supports the jury’s finding of at least one 
aggravating circumstance.” Id. at p.11, 33 So. 3d at 850–51. This “safeguard[s] a defendant’s 
right not to suffer cruel and unusual punishment, and . . . protect[s] society’s fundamental 
interest in ensuring that the coercive power of the State is not employed in a manner that 
shocks the community’s conscience or undermines the integrity of our criminal justice 
system.” Id. at p.11, 33 So. 3d at 851 (internal punctuation and citation omitted). Georgia has 
what appears to be an unusual system in which the Court not only must review the sentence 
as set out in the relevant statute, but also has the ability to require issues to be briefed. 
Colwell v. State, 543 S.E.2d 682, 682 (Ga. 2001) (“[I]n a death penalty case . . . the statutory 
basis for appellate review requires mandatory review. In addition, the Unified Appeal 
Procedure requires this Court to review a death penalty case, whether or not the defendant 
files a notice of appeal, and authorizes this Court to direct the defendant’s appellate counsel 
and the State’s attorney to brief and argue grounds not raised on appeal.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
14 Discussed infra subpart II(E).  
15 See Pike v. State, 164 S.W.3d 257, 265 (Tenn. 2005) (listing opinions permitting 
waiver of postconviction review in capital cases). New Jersey abolished the death penalty in 
2007. Jeremy W. Peters, Death Penalty Repealed in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/17/nyregion/17cnd-jersey.html, archived at http://perma.
cc/8WFW-U4QN.  
16 State v. Martini, 677 A.2d 1106, 1107 (N.J. 1996).  
17 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). 
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appellate court.18 The Ninth Circuit suggested at one point that its interest in 
ensuring the just administration of the death penalty could permit a federal 
court to reject a prisoner’s effort to waive appeals,19 but it subsequently 
stepped away from that position.20 Generally, the federal courts simply 
focus on whether a prisoner has met the legal criteria for waiver, as outlined 
below.21 
2. Legal Criteria for Hastening Execution 
Courts evaluate decisions to abandon appeals according to four 
criteria: the prisoner must make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
waiver of his rights to appeal, and he must be mentally competent.22 These 
criteria are commonly applied in other parts of the criminal justice system. 
In accepting a guilty plea, for example, the court engages in a (usually 
stock) colloquy with the defendant designed to elicit his agreement that he, 
having been advised by counsel, understands the consequences of his plea, 
including that he abandons certain constitutional rights when he pleads 
guilty (the “knowing and intelligent” waiver), and that he has not been 
coerced into giving up these rights (the “voluntariness” requirement).23 
Because the requirements for waiver are so low, the competency 
determination is the crux of the legal life of the volunteer.24 Generally, if the 
 
18 Id. § 2253 (2012). 
19 Comer v. Schriro, 463 F.3d 934, 950 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc granted sub nom, 
Comer v. Stewart, 471 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir. 2006), aff. sub nom, Comer v. Schriro, 480 F.3d 
960 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“To allow a defendant to choose his own sentence introduces 
unconscionable arbitrariness into the capital punishment system.”). 
20 Comer, 480 F.3d at 964 (“If Comer is competent to waive further proceedings, then 
we need not, and indeed cannot, decide whether any of Comer’s claims have merit or are 
procedurally barred because there is no dispute remaining between the parties.”). 
21 See, e.g., Simpson v. Quarterman, 341 F. App’x 68, 69 (5th Cir. 2009); Dennis ex rel. 
Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2004); Ford v. Haley, 195 F.3d 603, 617–24 (11th 
Cir. 1999); Harper v. Parker, 177 F.3d 567, 573 (6th Cir. 1999); In re Zettlemoyer, 53 F.3d 
24, 29 (3d Cir. 1995); Smith ex rel. Mo. Public Defender Comm’n v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 
1050, 1056–59 (8th Cir. 1987); Lopez v. Stephens, No. 2:12-CV-160, 2014 WL 2981056, at 
*7–11 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 2014); White v. Horn, 54 F. Supp. 2d 457, 467–70 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
22 Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400–01 (1993) (knowing, voluntary, intelligent, and 
competent); Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966) (defining competency).  
23 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748–49, 756 (1970); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
24 A few courts have suggested that conditions of incarceration could make a waiver 
involuntary. See, e.g., Comer v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910, 918 (9th Cir. 2000); Smith, 812 F.2d 
at 1050. In Groseclose ex rel. Harries v. Dutton, 594 F. Supp. 949, 961 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), 
the court granted next friend standing based on prison conditions’ effect on voluntariness, 
and, in Tabler v. Stephens, the district court  
deemed [Tabler] mentally competent . . . , [but it] ruled that his waiver was not 
voluntary. In October of 2008—more than one month after his original state court 
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prisoner is found competent, he will be able to waive his rights and his 
appeals. Only if the prisoner is found incompetent can others—such as 
parents—move to intervene as a “next friend” to continue the appeals.25 In 
the context of death-sentenced prisoners waiving appeals, courts generally 
cite the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision Rees v. Peyton, which asked 
whether the prisoner had the “capacity to appreciate his position and make a 
rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or 
on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or 
defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.”26 
In Rumbaugh v. Procunier,27 the Fifth Circuit confronted a tension 
inherent in this standard. Rumbaugh had a history of self-injury and suicide 
attempts, including when he charged a court officer in the middle of his 
competency hearing to provoke the officer shoot him.28 Mental health 
professionals testified that Rumbaugh grasped the logical consequences of 
his decision, but his decision to hasten his execution was substantially 
affected by a mental disease, namely severe depression.29 The Fifth Circuit 
then refined its interpretation of Rees by restricting the judicial 
determination of competence to whether the prisoner’s decision was “the 
product of a reasonable assessment of the legal and medical facts and a 
 
competency hearing—Tabler made a threatening phone call to a state senator while on 
death row. An inquiry into the call ultimately led to an investigation into cell phone 
smuggling in the prison, which purportedly resulted in threats and harassment from 
prison staff and fellow inmates. Whether or not Tabler’s perception matched reality, 
the district court found that Tabler genuinely believed his family would be harmed if 
he did not volunteer for execution and therefore found his attempt to waive his federal 
habeas relief involuntary. 
588 Fed. App’x. 297, 300 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated on other grounds, No. 12-70013, 
2015 WL 327646, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2015).  
25 Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731 (1990); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 
(1990); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). The issues of surrogate decisionmaking in 
death penalty cases and in cases involving the incompetent, severely ill person are quite 
different. For the volunteer, the surrogate simply opts to continue the litigation. See, e.g., In 
re Cockrum, 867 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (“Accordingly, it is ORDERED that 
[named attorney] be appointed ‘Next Friend’ of applicant, John Cockrum for the purposes of 
pursuing the writ of habeas corpus before this court. As such, he shall act in the best interest 
of the applicant in directing the habeas corpus proceedings before this court” and setting 
briefing schedule for habeas litigation). In the context of medical intervention, courts try to 
discern whether the surrogate is asking for what the patient would have wanted. ALAN 
MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE 
DECISIONMAKING (3rd ed. 2008) at 4-5–4-99. Because these issues are fundamentally so 
different (unlike, I contend, the issues associated with putatively competent requests to 
hasten one’s own death), I do not discuss them here. 
26 Rees, 384 U.S. at 314. 
27 753 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1985). 
28 Id. at 397, 406. 
29 Id. at 400–01, 406, 408–09. 
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reasoned thought process.”30 That the “rational decision-making process” 
took place within a severe depression was legally irrelevant. The depression 
may well have “contribute[d] to his invitation of death,” but the law 
required only that Rumbaugh be aware of his situation and his options in 
deciding to waive further appeals.31 In other words, the court need only 
“inquire about the discrete capacity to understand and make rational 
decisions concerning the proceedings at issue, and the presence or absence 
of mental illness or brain disorder is not dispositive.”32 
After the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Rumbaugh, the Supreme Court 
considered the case of Godinez v. Moran,33 in which it had to decide 
whether certain types of waivers required different types of mental 
competencies. Similar to Rumbaugh, Moran had previously attempted 
suicide, was experiencing “deep depression,” and took psychiatric 
medication.34 Harmonious with Rumbaugh’s holding, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the Constitution required only a single type of mental 
competency, namely that the prisoner have “sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” 
and “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him.”35 The Moran dissenters protested: “[T]he majority upholds the death 
sentence for a person whose decision to discharge counsel, plead guilty, and 
present no defense well may have been the product of medication or mental 
illness.”36 The majority opinion noted that “[r]equiring that a criminal 
defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the 
capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.”37 
As Moran and Rumbaugh make clear, mental competence is not a high 
bar to cross.38 The Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards39 recognized that 
this standard permits even severely mentally ill defendants to be found 
competent. 
 
30 Id. at 402. 
31 Id. The test articulated in Rumbaugh has been cited in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., 
Comer v. Schriro, 480 F.3d 960, 970 (9th Cir. 2007); Lonchar v. Zant, 978 F.2d 637, 640–42 
(11th Cir. 1993). 
32 Mata v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 324, 329 n.2 (2000). 
33 509 U.S. 389 (1993). 
34 Id. at 409–411, 417 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
35 Id. at 396–97 (majority opinion). 
36 Id. at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
37 Id. at 402 (majority opinion). 
38 See also, J.C. Oleson, Swilling Hemlock: The Legal Ethics of Defending a Client Who 
Wishes to Volunteer for Execution, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 147, 170 (2006) (explaining 
that under prevailing legal standards, “it is entirely possible for a clinically depressed but 
non-psychotic defendant to waive his appeals and to volunteer for execution”). 
39 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008). 
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B. HASTENING DEATH IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, state courts considered arguments that 
competent death-sentenced individuals could elect to discontinue medical 
treatment even though it would hasten their deaths.40 These arguments were 
based on a range of legal theories, including informed consent, right to 
privacy, and proscriptions against battery.41 Courts generally recognized an 
individual interest in refusing treatment, but balanced that right against the 
state’s interests, which were most commonly identified as the preservation 
of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of third parties, and the 
protection of the integrity of health care professionals.42 In Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme Court assumed 
without deciding that a competent person has a Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty interest in discontinuing medical treatment, including artificial 
nutrition and hydration, even if that refusal would cause or hasten her 
death.43 The Court noted, however, that that individual right is not absolute. 
Instead, it must be balanced against state interests.44 
Currently, when competent individuals ask to discontinue life-
sustaining medical intervention, hospitals and courts will generally permit 
them to do so.45 This is not true, however, where the patient asks for a third 
party to take an affirmative action that will hasten death. In Vacco v. Quill46 
and Washington v. Glucksberg,47 the Supreme Court considered challenges 
 
40 Thomas A. Eaton & Edward J. Larson, Experimenting with the “Right to Die” in the 
Laboratory of the States, 25 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1257–71 (1991). 
41 Id. 
42 MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 25, § 5.04. Superintendent of Belchertown State 
Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), provides a much-cited elaboration on these 
state interests. Protecting third parties includes protecting “particularly minor children, from 
the emotional and financial damage which may occur as a result of the decision of a 
competent adult to refuse life-saving or life-prolonging treatment.” Id. at 426. The concerns 
regarding the “ethical integrity of the medical profession” refer to tension between some 
medical providers’ belief that their personal or medical ethics require them to sustain life at 
all costs and their need to recognize their patients’ preferences. Id. at 426–27. 
43 497 U.S. 261, 269–70 (1990). Cruzan, like the Quinlan case cited by Gary Gilmore, 
involved the issue of surrogate decisionmaking, where family members asserted a right to 
die on behalf of the patient because she was incompetent to do so. 
44 Id. See also ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, THE LAW OF LIFE AND DEATH 161–62 (2011). 
45 The Saikewicz court found the state’s interest in preserving human life to be strongest 
where the question was whether, and not for how long, the individual’s life could be saved. 
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425–26. Meisel and Cerminara describe this as a “prognostic 
approach” where the state’s interest shrinks as the individual nears death. MEISEL & 
CERMINARA, supra note 25, at 5-42–5-45. This interest is also diminished, however, where 
the patient is competent. Id. at 5-45.  
46 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
47 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
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to state statutes that prohibited physicians from helping patients hasten 
death. Withholding treatment is considered “passive” euthanasia, while 
enlisting a doctor to administer a lethal drug is considered “active” 
euthanasia.48 In Vacco, the statute’s challengers contended that no clear 
distinction existed between active and passive euthanasia—discontinuing 
treatment, after all, commonly requires an act such as turning off a 
ventilator.49 They argued that the prohibition on assisted suicide violated 
patients’ equal protection rights by restricting the right to die to those who 
could die simply by discontinuing medical intervention.50 The Supreme 
Court in Vacco rejected this argument, making clear that it saw an 
important distinction between acts that hasten death by withholding 
treatment or only treating disease symptoms, and those that involve the 
administration of a substance with the intent to hasten death.51 
In Glucksberg, opponents of the state law restrictions argued that 
individuals had a fundamental right to hasten their own deaths and that, 
therefore, state restrictions on physicians’ ability to assist them were 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that the 
Constitution provided a fundamental liberty interest right to receive help in 
dying, and held that the state had legitimate interests in prohibiting such 
assistance.52 The Court identified the state interests as: “(1) preserving life; 
(2) preventing suicide; (3) avoiding the involvement of third parties and use 
of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; (4) protecting family members and 
loved ones; (5) protecting the integrity of the medical profession; and (6) 
avoiding future movement toward euthanasia and other abuses.”53 
The Supreme Court, however, saw no constitutional impediment to 
states developing statutes permitting physician-assisted suicide. While there 
was no federal constitutional right to assistance in dying, state legislatures 
were free to experiment with permitting such assistance.54 Since 
Glucksberg, Montana and New Mexico courts have struck down assisted 
suicide bans and California,55 Oregon, Vermont, and Washington have 
passed laws allowing physicians to help people die.56 As discussed below, 
 
48 James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 N. ENGL. J. MED. 78, 78 (1975). 
49 Vacco, 521 U.S. at 800–01. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 800–08. 
52 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728–735. 
53 Id. at 728 n.20. 
54 Id. at 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 789 (Souter, J., concurring). 
55 California adopted its assisted-dying statute as this issue went to print. 
56 OR. REV. STAT. 127.815 § 3.01(k)-(L) (2013); 18 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 113 §§ 5283(a) 
(2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.040 (k)-(l) (West 2011); Baxter v. Montana, 224 P.3d 
1211, 1217 (Mont. 2009) (“[Nothing in Montana law] indicat[es] that physician aid in dying 
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the regulatory framework established by these laws reveals limits that are 
not imposed on the death-sentenced prisoner. 
The assisted-dying statutes passed in California, Oregon, Vermont, and 
Washington permit physicians to prescribe a lethal dose of medication, but 
patients must administer the medication themselves.57 The statutes restrict 
the availability of physician-assisted suicide solely to an individual whom 
two doctors attest has “an incurable and irreversible disease that has been 
medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, 
produce death within six months.”58 In addition, Oregon and Washington 
prohibit providing assistance to any terminally ill individual who suffers 
from “a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing 
impaired judgment.”59 Vermont imposes an arguably lower standard: 
“‘Impaired judgment’ means that a person does not sufficiently understand 
or appreciate the relevant facts necessary to make an informed decision.”60 
A physician must “either verif[y] that the patient did not have impaired 
judgment or refer[] the patient for an evaluation by a psychiatrist, 
psychologist, or clinical social worker licensed in Vermont for confirmation 
that the patient was capable and did not have impaired judgment.”61  
C. ANALOGIZING THE VOLUNTEER TO THE SEVERELY ILL WHO SEEK 
TO DIE 
As outlined above and developed in greater detail below, the death row 
volunteer may hasten execution by competently waiving his appeals. In the 
medical context, the Supreme Court has rejected finding any constitutional 
right to obtain assistance in dying (active euthanasia), as opposed to 
discontinuing treatment (passive euthanasia). This raises the question of 
whether a death row volunteer’s waiver represents an active or passive 
effort to die. While a request to discontinue appeals—an act of omission—
appears analogous to a request to discontinue medical treatment, the 
 
is against public policy”); Phil Milford, Right to Die with Doctor’s Help Affirmed in New 
Mexico, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-14/right-to-
die-with-doctor-s-help-affirmed-in-new-mexico.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FVA3-
5VNR. 
57 OR. REV. STAT. 127.805 § 2.01(1); 127.815 § 3.01(L); 127.880 § 3.14 (doctors may 
prescribe and dispense, but may not administer, lethal drugs); 18 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 113 § 
5283(a) (2012); § 5283(a)(13); § 5292 (same); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.020(1) (2011); 
§ 70.245.040(1)(l)(i); § 70.245.180(1) (same).  
58 OR. REV. STAT. 127.800 § 1.01(12) (2013); 127.815 § 3.01(1)(a); 127.820 § 3.02; 18 
VT. STAT. ANN. ch. 113 § 5283(a), (a)(7) (2012); § 5281(10); WASH. REV. CODE § 
70.245.040(1)(a); § 70.245.050; § 70.245.010(13) (2011).  
59 OR. REV. STAT. 127.825 § 3.03 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.245.060 (2011). 
60 18 VT. STAT. ANN. ch. 113 § 5281(5) (2012). 
61 Id. at § 5283(a)(8). 
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comparison to active assistance by a third party is more apt. As Blume 
notes: 
[T]he right to refuse life-saving medical treatment, assuming there is such a right, is 
grounded in the individual’s right to bodily integrity, which is not at issue in the 
volunteer context. Furthermore, in the refusal-of-treatment situation, a third party does 
not have to take action to bring about the person’s death, which again is not true in the 
volunteer context.62 
Multiple third parties must act to hasten the volunteer’s death. Not 
only must individuals working on behalf of the prison do something to the 
prisoner’s body—in lethal injection, for example, someone must insert a 
needle in the prisoner’s vein and start the flow of poisonous chemicals—but 
the state must also impose an execution date. In these cases, we see 
prisoners actively seek an execution date as the state generally will not set 
one until appeals are concluded. While rare, some prisoners remain on 
death row even after their appeals are exhausted. More commonly, a case 
will simply pend on appeal while a court decides the case, unless the 
prisoner campaigns to dismiss his appeal and have the court set his 
execution date.63 Recognizing active euthanasia as the proper analogy 
reveals the very different ways desires to die are regulated. Data on how the 
law treats death-sentenced prisoners’ efforts to be killed are troubling when 
considered in light of this comparison. 
II. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS REGARDING DEATH ROW PRISONERS, INCLUDING 
“VOLUNTEERS” 
While empirical research on volunteers lags far behind that on those 
with severe and terminal illness, new research, including a study I recently 
conducted on Texas volunteers, contradicts several assumptions made in 
much of the prior scholarship on volunteers. It suggests that it is time to 
revisit the legal standard. 
For my study of the thirty-one Texas prisoners death-sentenced after 
Gregg who succeeded in hastening their execution by dropping their 
appeals,64 I reviewed court documents, prison records, and media reports, 
 
62 Blume, supra note 6, at 947–48 n.45. 
63 In Reed v. State, AP-69,292 (Tex. Crim. App. March 29, 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
1050 (1996), for example, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals took twelve years to decide 
Jonathan Reed’s case. The case pended for eight years before the court remanded the case 
for a hearing.  
64 Texas has by far the greatest number of volunteers. According to the Death Penalty 
Information Center, twenty-six states had fewer than five volunteers; seven had five or more, 
but fewer than ten. One had eleven. While my research found that the DPIC data were not 
entirely accurate, even within the DPIC database, Texas stands out with twenty-eight 
reported volunteers, more than double than that of the next highest state, Nevada. DEATH 
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and conducted interviews with individuals who knew the prisoners. Unlike 
previous empirical studies of volunteers, I compared this population to a 
matched sample of non-volunteers, here, seventy-three Texas male death 
row prisoners of the same race or ethnicity (according to prison records) 
and approximate age who arrived on death row within six months of a 
particular volunteer and who went through at least one round of appeals and 
postconviction litigation.65  This comparison brings into focus what may—
and may not—distinguish volunteers from non-volunteers. These data also 
underscore the relevance of the "right to die" legal categories to death row 
prisoners. 
A. DEATH ROW VOLUNTEERS GENERALLY DO NOT HAVE A 
“TERMINAL” CONDITION COMPARABLE TO THAT WHICH LIMITS 
APPLICABILITY OF “DEATH WITH DIGNITY” STATUTES 
Terminal illness is conventionally understood by courts as an illness 
that will kill the patient within six months.66 In my study of Texas 
volunteers, none met this definition. Instead, over 80% had waived appeals 
by the time their cases reached state postconviction proceedings. In other 
words, they bypassed state postconviction proceedings, federal habeas 
 
PENALTY INFO. CTR. EXECUTION DATABASE, supra note 3. In conducting my dissertation 
research, I identified thirty-one death-sentenced Texas prisoners. Rountree, Directions for 
Research, supra note 8, at 301–04. 
65 Rountree, Directions for Research, supra note 8, at 301–04. John Blume’s 2005 study 
compared volunteers to non-incarcerated suicides. Blume, supra note 6. Vandiver, 
Giacopassi, and Turner compared volunteers and non-volunteers nationally, which may have 
obscured important state-by-state variations, among other things. Vandiver et al., supra note 
3. According to the Death Penalty Information Center execution database, some counties—
like Harris County, Texas, for example—are responsible for more executions than several 
states combined. Some states such as Nevada (eleven out of twelve), Oregon (two out of 
two), and Washington (three out of five) have executed almost exclusively volunteers. Some 
states execute so few that a prisoner might expect to live decades on death row before facing 
execution. Death row conditions also vary across states. If any of these factors matter, it is 
reasonable to believe that the dynamics in hastening execution could be very different in 
different places. Comparing all volunteers with all those executed in the modern era erases 
these differences. The likelihood of state-by-state variation obviously suggests caution in 
generalizing from the Texas data (though Texas volunteers are the most numerous), as well 
as the need for additional empirical research.  
66 OR. REV. STAT. 127.800 §1.01(12) (2013); WASH. REV. CODE §70.245 (West 2011); 
McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 630 (Nev. 1990). Scholarship advocating for volunteers’ 
right to hasten death commonly overstates the inevitability of execution and omits the legal 
understanding of “terminal.” See, e.g., Dama, supra note 7, at 1097 (prisoners “seek[ing] to 
greet imminent and unavoidable death on their own terms”); Milner, supra note 7, at 298, 
301 (“inevitable death”; death-sentenced prisoner has a condition that will “inevitably” take 
his life). 
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proceedings in district court, and federal appellate litigation. This litigation 
would ordinarily take more than six months to conclude. 
Further, not all death-sentenced prisoners will be executed. A study of 
state and federal court reversal rates in capital cases between 1973 and 1995 
found that courts found “serious, reversible error” in 68% of capital cases.67 
During this period, state courts reversed 47% of capital cases, and federal 
courts reversed 40% of those cases that were affirmed by the state courts.68 
Of those prisoners granted a new trial because of prosecutorial or defense 
counsel misconduct, 82% were resentenced to punishments less than 
death.69 Not even Texas, which uses the death penalty vigorously, can claim 
that any individual death-sentenced prisoner will be executed within six 
months. Since the return of the death penalty in 1977, only 46% of those 
sentenced to death in Texas have been executed, with almost 22.5% 
winning reversal or commutation.70 
B. DEATH ROW VOLUNTEERS’ INCREASED RISK FOR SUICIDE 
While many might find it completely rational that those on death row 
might want to end it all, in fact such prisoners are a minority.71 Proponents 
of an unqualified Fourteenth Amendment right to execution contend that 
the prisoners are essentially making a rational decision to end the suffering 
they experience on death row. One commentator has suggested that “[t]he 
simple reason most condemned prisoners want to terminate their appeals is 
that they find conditions on death row intolerable.”72 
The Texas data, however, indicate that most volunteers expressed a 
desire for or sought execution very early, sometimes before they even got to 
death row. Volunteers often had a constellation of reasons for giving up 
their appeals. However, the most common sentiment expressed (by 61.3% 
of volunteers) was that they sought execution because they believed it was 
an appropriate punishment. Only a few prisoners (16.1%) complained about 
 
67 JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973–
1995, at i (2000). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at ii. 
70 TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2012 – 
STATISTICAL TABLES at 20 (2014)  
71 For an expanded discussion of suicidality among volunteers, see Rountree, Directions 
for Research, supra note 8, at 304–25.  
72 Melvin I. Urofsky, A Right to Die: Termination of Appeal for Condemned Prisoners, 
75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553, 568–69 (1984); see also, e.g., Milner, supra note 7. 
Only Strafer factored this into an analysis of the voluntariness of the prisoner’s decision. 
Strafer, supra note 4, at 885–94. It bears repeating that people with a painful but not terminal 
illness may not legally obtain assistance in hastening death anywhere in the United States. 
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the conditions of incarceration, as distinct from the fact of incarceration 
(51.6%).73 
Also concerning is the earliness of the prisoners’ decisions to hasten 
death. For one, suicide in custody is strongly associated with the earliest 
stages of custody.74 For another, psychological research on affective 
forecasting “consistently shows that people are poor predictors of their 
future well-being. Specifically, people overestimate the impact and duration 
of negative emotions in response to loss.”75 This phenomenon may explain 
why, at least in Texas, individuals facing the death penalty generally sought 
execution at trial or soon after conviction. This pattern became particularly 
apparent after a 1994 decision from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
held that prisoners were able to waive an adversarial direct appeal.76 Prior to 
this decision, 75% of volunteers spent more than forty-eight months on 
death row; after, only 27% did.77 
In addition, significant psychological research of the severely ill, while 
contested, suggests that those who seek to hasten death have unmet 
psychiatric or palliative needs.78 Certainly, death row prisoners are 
 
73 Meredith Martin Rountree, “The Things That Death Will Buy”: A Sociolegal 
Examination of Texas Death-Sentenced Prisoners Who Sought Execution 90–92 (2012) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with the Journal).  
74 DAVID A. CRIGHTON & GRAHAM J. TOWL, PSYCHOLOGY IN PRISONS 188 (2nd ed. 
2008); see also Jo Borrill, Self-Inflicted Deaths of Prisoners Serving Life Sentences 1988–
2001, 40 BRIT J. FORENSIC PRAC. 30–38 (2002) (about half of lifers were likely to kill 
themselves within a year of conviction).  
75 Jodi Halpern & Robert M. Arnold, Affective Forecasting: An Unrecognized Challenge 
in Making Serious Health Decisions, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1708, 1708 (2008); see also 
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 
IND. L.J. 155, 192–201 (2005) (citing evidence of death-sentenced prisoners’ adaptation to 
death row); William E. Haley et al., Family Issues in End-of-Life Decision Making and End-
of-Life Care, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 284 (2002). 
76 Lott v. State, 874 S.W.2d 687, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). In Lott, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals decided that where the prisoner waived direct appeal, it would review the 
record—unassisted by any briefing—for “fundamental error,” a category of error that is 
neither defined nor used in any other type of case. Not only does this decision raise more 
questions than it answers with respect to the scope of the court’s review, it also created a 
process for nonadversarial legal review where one already existed. Subsequent to Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), counsel may file a brief that identifies possible legal 
errors, and argues why the law is clear that those errors do not undermine the reliability of 
the verdict. The appellate court considers this briefing in deciding whether to affirm the 
conviction and sentence. In Lott’s case, the TCCA did not even have the benefit of this 
minimal briefing.  
77 Rountree, Directions for Research, supra note 8, at 319. 
78 N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED 
SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 23–47, 153–81 (1994); BARRY 
ROSENFELD, ASSISTED SUICIDE AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 77–109 (2004) (discussing research on 
the role of depression, hopelessness, and pain in desires to hasten death, and requests for 
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substantially burdened by mental disorders.79 Cunningham and Vigen’s 
2002 meta-analysis of the psychological literature found that the death row 
population as a whole has a high prevalence of mental illness and substance 
abuse and addiction. In their review of the literature on death row prisoners, 
they noted that eleven out of thirteen clinical studies of death row prisoners 
found “a high incidence of psychological symptoms and disorders, ranging 
from maladaptive defenses to pervasive depression, mood lability, and 
diminished mental acuity to episodic and chronic psychosis.”80 Death row 
prisoners also “appear to have a disproportionate rate of serious 
psychological disorders relative to a general prison population.”81 These 
mental impairments may also impair their ability to imagine any 
improvement in their situation. 
In addition, prisoners generally have higher suicide rates than non-
prisoners, and death row prisoners have higher rates of suicide as compared 
to non-death-row prisoners.82 The two empirical studies looking specifically 
at volunteers and suicide—Blume’s and my own—found a concerning 
resemblance between those who commit suicide and those who volunteer. 
After collecting questionnaire responses from legal team members in cases 
involving volunteers and attempted volunteers from across the country, 
Blume found similarities between those in the free world who have taken 
their own lives and death row volunteers. In addition to being comprised 
largely of white males, both groups had significant histories of mental 
illness and substance abuse.83 
In the Texas study I conducted, I identified traits associated with 
suicide in prison and used those to compare Texas volunteers with a 
matched sample of Texas death row prisoners who did not hasten their 
executions. Several indicators present in the volunteer population were 
consistent with the suicide literature. For example, as with other prisoners 
who commit suicide, volunteers are more likely to have prior criminal 
 
physician-assisted suicide) . 
79 Blume, supra note 6, at 962–63; Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row 
Inmate Characteristics, Adjustment, and Confinement: A Critical Review of the Literature, 
20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 191 (2002). While mental dysfunction is prevalent in both the volunteer 
and non-volunteer Texas groups, it is important to note that those seeking execution have an 
incentive to minimize any mental problems. See Rountree, Accounts, supra note 8, at 606; 
Rountree, Directions for Research, supra note 8, at 306–08.  
80 Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 79, at 200. 
81 Id. 
82 LINDSAY M. HAYES, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NIC ACCESSION 
NO. 024308, NATIONAL STUDY OF JAIL SUICIDE: 20 YEARS LATER 1–2 (2010) (jail and prison 
suicide rates); CHRISTINE TARTARO & DAVID LESTER, SUICIDE AND SELF-HARM IN PRISONS 
AND JAILS 31 (2008) (death row suicide rate). 
83 Blume, supra note 6, at 942. 
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convictions, prior convictions for crimes against persons, and prior 
experiences with incarceration than non-volunteers.84 The exception to this 
was among those sentenced to death for offenses involving a domestic 
crisis. This group’s criminal experience was lower than the other 
volunteers, whether measured by their prior convictions, crimes against 
persons, or time in prison. This too is consistent with the prison suicide 
literature, which recognizes differences in suicide populations. 85 
Differences in capital crimes also yielded some suggestive results. 
Compared to other similarly situated death row prisoners, the Texas 
volunteers were less likely to have committed the crime with another person 
and more likely to have used a gun in the murder.86 Acting in groups may 
encourage offending by diffusing responsibility.87 Conversely, solo 
offending may concentrate a sense of greater responsibility in the individual 
actor, both in the eyes of actor and those around him. This feeling of greater 
responsibility may be linked to a conclusion that the individual offended for 
dispositional rather than situational reasons; they broke the law because of 
something about them, not because of something about the situation.88 
Shame and guilt have been linked to an increased risk of suicide.89 
These prisoners may feel that they are more culpable for their crimes 
than those who are able to diffuse responsibility onto others. As a result, 
they may feel that they deserve their punishment, and so ask for execution. 
They may also translate this sense of increased culpability into a statement 
 
84 Rountree, Directions for Research, supra note 8, at 308–11. With respect to 
characteristics of prisoner suicide, see, e.g., CRIGHTON & TOWL, supra note 74; 
CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, SUICIDE AND HOMICIDE IN STATE PRISONS AND LOCAL JAILS 7–8 
(2005); Borrill, supra note 74, at 32, 35; Alison Liebling, Prison Suicide and Prisoner 
Coping, 26 PRISONS 283 (1999) (though also noting contradictory findings). 
85 See, e.g., Scott Eliason, Murder–Suicide: A Review of the Recent Literature, 37 J. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 371 (2009). 
86 In the Texas Study, 61.3% of the volunteers used a gun, where 49.3% of the non-
volunteer sample used a gun. Where 49.3% of the non-volunteer sample committed the 
capital crime with at least one other person, 29% of the volunteers had a co-participant. 
Rountree, Directions for Research, supra note 8, at 312. 
87 Leanne F. Alarid et al., Group and Solo Robberies: Do Accomplices Shape Criminal 
Form?, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 1 (2009).  
 88 Robert S. Feldman & Fred P. Rosen, Diffusion of Responsibility in Crime, 
Punishment, and Other Adversity, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 318 (1978). 
89 Craig J. Bryan et al., Guilt Is More Strongly Associated with Suicidal Ideation Among 
Military Personnel with Direct Combat Exposure, 148 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 37, 40 
(2013); Herbert Hendin & Ann P. Haas, Suicide and Guilt as Manifestations of PTSD in 
Vietnam Combat Veterans, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 586, 589 (1991) (“The most significant 
finding . . . was clear and consistent relationship between veterans’ combat-related guilt and 
postservice suicidal behavior.”); David Lester, The Role of Shame in Suicide, 27 SUICIDE & 
LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 352 (1997) (noting associations of shame with suicide and 
encouraging further research). 
2015] CRIMINALS GET ALL THE RIGHTS 169 
about their disposition or character. They may decide that they are 
worthless and that they lack the possibility of redemption in this life. This 
feeling could combine with other stressors or vulnerabilities to motivate a 
decision to hasten death. 
The finding about gun use is also provocative, because it suggests the 
possibility of more impulsive or intoxicated lethal acts. Death row inmate 
Steven Morin reportedly told a friend said that he did not intend to kill his 
victim—he had been in the middle of stealing her car when she confronted 
him—but “something came over him and the gun went off.”90 Richard 
Foster described his gun homicide as an “accident” and “not intentional.”91 
Whether Foster’s story is true or not, a prisoner’s impulsive use of the gun 
could become part of his personal narrative of greater shame and guilt and 
desire for self-destruction. 
In addition to possibly having greater overall risk of suicide, some 
individual volunteers were plainly suicidal. Charles Rumbaugh’s case is the 
most dramatic. In the course of his testimony in support of his request to 
waive his appeals, he announced: 
 
All I really wanted to say is that it doesn’t matter to me; that I’ve already picked 
my own executioner and I’ll just make them kill me. If they don’t want to do it . . . 
if they don’t want to take me down there and execute me, I’ll make them shoot me. 
I think I’ll make them shoot me right now. 
He then pulled a prison-made knife from his pocket and was shot after he charged the 
deputy U.S. Marshal, shouting “Shoot!”92 
Steven Renfro, another Texas death row prisoner, was described at 
trial as having attempted “suicide by cop” at the time he was arrested. The 
State’s psychiatrist interviewed Renfro for four hours prior to trial, and 
testified: “He made it clear that he wanted it to end it that day [of his arrest], 
to have been shot and killed. Renfro wanted to be and intended to be killed 
that night by the police officers [and] wants to die now.”93 The defense 
psychiatrist at trial believed that Renfro wanted help in hastening death 
because of his religious beliefs, but that his suicidal depression could be 
treated: 
 
90 Stephen Peter Morin, MURDERPEDIA, http://murderpedia.org/male.M/m1/morin-
stephen-peter.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9MJZ-4BLD.  
91 Foster v. Johnson, No. 4:92−cv−00615−Y (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2000) (findings of fact 
on remanded issue); David Carson, Richard Foster, TEX. EXECUTIONS INFO. CTR. (Aug. 27, 
2012), http://www.txexecutions.org/reports/216.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/T27R-
KH7U.  
92 Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1985). 
93 Reporter’s Record (RR) at 27:3438, 3450, 3481, Renfro v. State, AP-72,794 (Tex. 
Crim. App).  
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Mr. Renfro . . . [is] profoundly depressed. . . . [H]e was suicidal before the murders 
and he is still suicidal, but he doesn’t want to go to hell, so he wants someone else to 
kill him. He’s in a lot of pain. He’s in a lot of emotional pain. His depression hasn’t 
been treated. I expect he will always carry with him the guilt. He may not—if 
appropriately treated, he may not always be suicidal.94 
In all, these data demonstrate the salience of mental distress, mental 
illness, and suicidality within this population. 
C. DEATH ROW PRISONERS CAN HAVE MEANINGFUL RELATIONSHIPS 
WITH THIRD PARTIES 
One scholar captured the way courts have isolated death row 
volunteers from their social world by comparing the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Gilmore to the portrait painted by Norman Mailer in The 
Executioner’s Song, his book about Gary Gilmore.95 She observes:  
The Executioner’s Song portrays the grand, interconnected mass of humanity that 
formed around even the least worthy person and illustrates how his fate included it all 
. . . . [I]n contrast to the book’s dramatization of the connection among all of the 
persons it names, the Court portrayed Gary Gilmore as an autonomous human being 
and his mother as a separate person. It made no reference to anyone else.96  
Those advocating for an unfettered death row “right to die” further this 
social atomization by marginalizing the death row prisoner’s connection to 
family. The children of death-sentenced prisoners have diminished interests 
in their parent’s decision to die because their parent cannot contribute 
financially nor “participate in day-to-day family life as a normal parent.”97 
This argument reduces familial contribution to financial support and 
“normal” parenting in a way that excludes not only incarcerated parents but 
also, e.g., some parents with disabilities or debilitating illness. Further, it is 
contradicted by even the brief glimpses of death row prisoners’ family life 
that appear in court documents, media accounts, and the empirical 
literature. 
One study of children of death row prisoners found “[t]he most 
prevalent theme was the children’s discussion of the importance of having 
their parent in their lives even if the relationship could only occur from 
death row.”98 While many chafed at the obstacles prison imposed on 
developing a meaningful relationship with their fathers, at least some of the 
 
94 Id. at RR 29:3744–45. 
95 NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECUTIONER’S SONG (1979). 
96 Ann Althouse, Standing, in Fluffy Slippers, 77 VA. L. REV. 1177, 1183 (1991). 
97 Johnson, supra note 7, at 616. 
98 Elizabeth Beck & Sandra J. Jones, Children of the Condemned: Grieving the Loss of a 
Father to Death Row, 56 OMEGA 191, 197 (2007–2008). 
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children discussed their father’s role in raising them, even from death row.99 
For these children, their fathers provided advice, emphasized the 
importance of going to school and staying away from crime, and acted as 
agents of informal social control.100 The impact of their father’s execution 
was generally “profound” and negative.101 
While imperfect proxies of the condemned’s connectedness to others, 
data from the Texas prison system regarding witnesses to executions 
indicate that most volunteers had some social ties to the outside world. Of 
the volunteers on whom I obtained information, 89.6% (27) invited 
witnesses to their execution, and of those, 93.1% (25) had witnesses other 
than clergy or attorneys. In addition, only 17.2% (5) of volunteers are 
buried in the prison cemetery, where they are buried under their prison 
number and not their name. So many volunteers being buried elsewhere 
suggests that the vast majority had relationships with people outside of 
prison that were strong enough that those individuals collected their bodies 
and made arrangements to bury them privately. 
Further, these data may understate relationships, as prisoners may have 
had important social relationships not reflected in the prison records. 
Anthony Cook, for instance, had only his spiritual advisor (who had 
previously witnessed several executions) present at his execution, but his 
mother, stepfather, brother, sister, in-laws, and cousins joined the spiritual 
advisor at the funeral home after the execution.102 Cook’s burial in the 
prison cemetery103 may simply reflect that his family did not have the 
means to bury him. Another prisoner had no one from his nuclear family 
witness his execution, but in his final days, he visited with his mother, 
brothers, first wife, and his four children.104 
In Texas competency hearings, while families are not always invisible, 
no one represents their interests. In two cases,105 which were unusual for 
involving family in the first place, family members positioned themselves 
 
99 Id. at 197, 200, 201–04. 
100 See, e.g., id. at 200 (after his father was executed, one child became aggressive 
toward others, but once he turned eighteen, “he realized that he would have to find a way to 
deal with his anger, lest he break a promise he had made to stay out of jail in order to care 
for his father’s mother, whom has served as [the child’s] caretaker from the time that his 
father was incarcerated.”) 
101 Id. at 208. 
102 Susan Blaustein, Witness to Another Execution: In Texas, Death Walks an Assembly 
Line, HARPERS, May 1994, at 53.  
103 Id. at 62. 
104 Roy Bragg, Remorseful Killer Wants to Die for Crime/Families of Victims Can’t 
Forgive, Forget, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 2, 1987, § 1, at 1. 
105 Joe Fedelfido Gonzales, Jr., AP-71.253 (Tex. Crim. App.); James Scott Porter, No. 
1:03–cv–448 (E.D. Tex.). 
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as agents to dissuade the prisoner from ending his life or attest to his fixity 
of purpose. The family members’ testimony about what the prisoner meant 
to them, whether he had children who would suffer from his death, and 
whether they thought his incarceration was a terrible burden on them was 
not included in the court’s calculus in permitting the prisoner to hasten 
execution. 
D. VOLUNTEERS’ LEGAL PROCEEDINGS MAY NOT BE VIGOROUSLY 
LITIGATED 
The Fourteenth Amendment medical intervention cases inquire into 
the effect of hastening death on the integrity of the medical profession. 
Similar to doctors who are treating a patient who is terminally ill and 
desires to hasten his death, attorneys representing a client who seeks to 
hasten his execution are beset by conflicting professional and ethical 
directives. 
The legal academy has devoted substantial attention to lawyers’ ethical 
responsibilities to the client who wants to die, reaching contradictory 
conclusions.106 Further, while an agency role is the putative norm for the 
attorney–client relationship, it is not the standard of practice in death 
penalty cases. The American Bar Association’s Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 
state forcefully: 
Some clients will initially insist that they want to be executed—as punishment or 
because they believe they would rather die than spend the rest of their lives in prison; 
some clients will want to contest their guilt by not present mitigation. It is ineffective 
assistance for counsel to simply acquiesce to such wishes, which usually reflect the 
distorting effects of overwhelming feelings of guilt and despair rather than a rational 
decision in favor of state-assisted suicide.107 
 
106 See, e.g., MICHAEL MELLO, THE UNITED STATES V. THEODORE JOHN KACZINSKI: 
ETHICS, POWER, AND THE INVENTION OF THE UNABOMBER 25–26, 189–213 (1999) (criticizing 
counsel for working against client’s wishes); Richard W. Garnett, Sectarian Reflections on 
Lawyers’ Ethics and Death Row Volunteers, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 808–09, 819 
(2002) (reflecting on complexity of attorney’s task in representing volunteer and the limits of 
professional rules); C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the 
Ethics of Death Row Volunteering, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 849, 860–76 (2000) (describing 
range of attitudes of death penalty cause lawyers regarding volunteers); Oleson, supra note 
38, at 228–29 (arguing ethical rules not useful for lawyers representing volunteers and that 
“ethical lawyer should refuse to acquiesce to the volunteering client’s wishes” because of 
“death row syndrome”).  
107 American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1009–10 (2003) 
(emphasis added). 
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Further, “[t]he duty to investigate [mitigating evidence] exists 
regardless of the expressed desires of a client.”108 
In the Texas study, none of the successful Texas volunteers appears to 
have had an adversarial hearing in which counsel marshaled lay and expert 
witnesses to attack the assertions that the prisoner was competent and 
waiving his rights knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.109 Many 
attorneys were, nonetheless, plainly pained by reducing their role to simply 
effectuating their client’s wish to die. Like doctors, the attorneys are torn 
between what they see as the object of their professional skills—winning a 
reversal of the conviction or sentence—and their duty to the individuals 
whose lives they are entrusted with. When asked by the court whether he 
thought his client was capable of waiving his appeals, one attorney finally 
said, “Your Honor, these are the hardest questions that I’ve had to answer in 
my life. It appears to me that he does.”110 Another stated in response to 
similar questions, “I wish that I didn’t, Judge. I know that he does. He 
understands everything.”111 
E. LITIGATION WITHOUT COUNSEL THREATENS THE INTEGRITY OF 
THE LEGAL PROCESS 
Nonadversarial waiver proceedings can leave critical factual questions 
unanswered,112 and in Texas at least, important legal questions may also 
remain unaddressed. While statutes suggest almost every state requires 
“automatic” judicial review of death sentences, Texas offers a cautionary 
 
108 Id. at 1021. 
109 In Christopher Swift’s and Michael Rodriguez’s cases, counsel actively advocated 
against their clients’ wishes in the course of the hearing on the waiver, but in both cases, 
counsel relied primarily on legal argument. Through cross-examination they challenged 
some of the evidence, but they presented no separate evidence or experts. Hearing, 
Rodriguez v. Quarterman, 3:06–cv–00965–G (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2007) Hearing, State v. 
Swift, F-2003–1720–C (Denton Cty, Tex. Feb. 2, 2006). Based on a press report, Stephen 
Morin’s counsel sought a stay of execution to raise the issue of mental competency, but the 
trial judge, based on his observations of Morin, concluded Morin was mentally competent 
and refused a hearing. Jacque Crouse & Terry Donahue, Lawyer: ‘Blood’ on Mattox’ Hands, 
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, March 13, 1985, at A5. Ramon Hernandez’s trial counsel 
unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution as a “next friend.” Hernandez’s former counsel 
argued that Hernandez’s waiver was based on a mistake of law, not mental incompetence. 
Lovelace v. Lynaugh, 809 F.2d 1136, 1137 (5th Cir. 1987). 
110 Dec. 19, 1997 11.071 Hearing at 54, Ex parte Tuttle, AP–72,387 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1997). 
111 July 16, 1998 Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal, State v. Foust, 
AP–73,130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).  
112 See Rountree, Accounts, supra note 8, at 605–14 (describing questionable mental 
health assessments and court proceedings normalizing desire to die).  
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example of possible gaps being left between the law on the books and the 
law in action. 
During the sentencing phase of Christopher Jay Swift’s trial, Swift 
refused to permit his lawyers to present mitigating evidence to persuade the 
jury to sentence him to life rather than death.113 One court-appointed 
psychiatrist determined that Swift was insane at the time of the crime. Swift 
explained to the court that he wanted the death penalty because voices in his 
head “haunt me daily, and I feel that, you know, death is going to be the 
only thing that takes them away.”114 Swift’s direct appeal lawyer filed a 
substantial brief in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) arguing 
that imposing the death penalty under these circumstances violated the 
Constitution. After Swift was granted the right to proceed pro se, the TCCA 
“unfiled,” or removed from the record of the case, the brief filed by counsel 
and did not consider it in affirming Swift’s conviction and sentence.115 
Swift’s is a particularly stark example because the court explicitly 
disregarded a legal argument regarding the unconstitutionality of his 
execution. In most volunteer cases, however, no brief would be filed in the 
first place, as counsel already would have been discharged. In these cases, 
no counsel alerts the appellate court to questions of innocence, mental 
illness, racial bias, or official misconduct—issues that fundamentally 
undermine the legitimacy of the death penalty. 
III. SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON RIGHTS TO DIE 
What accounts for these differences in judicial thinking about 
terminally ill and death-sentenced people? How did the despised and 
marginalized end up with a more expansive right than the innocent ill? 
Conversely, others may wonder why anyone would be surprised that those 
sentenced to death would have an easier time getting themselves killed. 
That is the point of the punishment, after all. 
While this outcome may not be surprising on the surface, the reasons 
for it are not the obvious ones. It is not simply that judges hope for some 
kind of political or ideological benefit from hastening an execution—
indeed, in the Texas cases, at least two judges expressed great discomfort 
when faced with prisoners who sought execution.116 Instead, these legal 
standards are animated by beliefs about sick people, free will, criminality, 
 
113 Transcript of Record at 35:28–35 and 36:9, State v. Swift, F-2003-1720-C (Denton 
Cty., Tex. 2006). 
114 Id. at 35:34. 
115 State v. Swift, AP-75,186, 2006 WL 269266 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2006). 
116 2 Reporter’s Record at 40, State v. Gonzales, AP-72,253 (Tex. Crim. App.); July 6, 
2000 Hearing at 20–21, State v. Hayes, AP-73,830 (Tex. Crim. App.). 
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mental illness, and who is on death row. Further, they are embedded within 
a particular historical context. 
A. AMONG THE VERY ILL 
Self-killing has a long history of state proscription, though desires to 
die have become substantially medicalized as self-killing is now more 
likely to be seen as potentially pathological rather than unpatriotic.117 The 
sociolegal framework undergirding medical decisions hastening death 
reflects a number of questions about the appropriate roles for individuals, 
medicine, government, and God to play in ending life, as well as the 
relationships between desires for death and mental illness. These questions 
are situated in a particular historical moment that is shaped by the freighted 
history of euthanasia movements, the heart-rending realities of modern 
medicine’s capabilities, the revolution in the doctor–patient relationship, 
and the emergence of the civil rights discourse. The ascendance of the 
rights framework in medical decisionmaking enabled euthanasia advocates 
to recast their advocacy of hastening death as a type of right, where 
previously it had been seen as a vehicle for social improvement. In addition 
to being politically expedient, it also fixed the legal question within a 
framework that requires investigating and balancing competing interests. 
While hardly the first legal case to present the question of 
discontinuing or foregoing medical treatment, Karen Ann Quinlan’s case 
gripped the public imagination. It is widely cited as the beginning of the 
modern American discussion about the right to die.118 Newsweek, which 
 
117 See, e.g., GEORGES MINOIS, HISTORY OF SUICIDE 7–9 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 
1999); id. at 9 (describing suicides from the Middle Ages “condemned as murder, [leading] 
to savage punishment inflicted on the dead body and to confiscation of the estate of the 
deceased”); see also FOLEY, supra note 44, at 154–56; MINOIS, supra, at 33 (describing St. 
Thomas Aquinas’s influential argument against suicide as an offense against nature, society 
and God); id. at 282–83 (describing decline in criminal prosecution and punishment of 
corpses of suicides in eighteenth century France); id. at 291 (noting that the French king 
“could not tolerate [subjects] disposing of life freely, thus weakening his kingdom and his 
authority”); id. at 324 (noting political assertion that “it was ‘medically demonstrated that 
candidates for suicide are pathological cases’”). 
118 See, e.g., IAN DOWBIGGIN, A MERCIFUL END: THE EUTHANASIA MOVEMENT IN 
MODERN AMERICA 146–47 (2003) (quoting a comparison of Quinlan’s case to Brown v. 
Board of Education); ELAINE FOX ET AL., COME LOVELY AND SOOTHING DEATH: THE RIGHT 
TO DIE MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (1999) (noting that Quinlan “dramatically 
focused public attention on the passive euthanasia issue”); ELIZABETH ATWOOD GAILEY, 
WRITE TO DEATH: NEWS FRAMING OF THE RIGHT TO DIE CONFLICT, FROM QUINLAN’S COMA 
TO KEVORKIAN’S CONVICTION 18–19 (2003) (citing media coverage in the wake of the 
Quinlan case).  
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featured her case as its cover story in November 1975, economically 
invoked common anxieties surrounding decisions to hasten death.119 
The article first outlined the primary legal dispute: after recognizing 
that his daughter would not recover from a persistent vegetative state, Karen 
Ann Quinlan’s father sought to be appointed her guardian in order to ask 
the hospital to turn off the ventilator that supported her breathing. The 
hospital refused. The parties went to court. The story then quoted one 
lawyer arguing that Quinlan was not “brain dead” and that by removing the 
ventilator, the court would be “just extinguish[ing] life because she is an 
eyesore.”120 Another asked, “Where do we draw the line?”121 Nazi 
Germany’s practice of euthanizing “cripples, mental incompetents, 
epileptics, the elderly and others held to be socially undesirable” was 
invoked,122 and a physician recalled an infant born with a treatable but 
highly disfiguring condition. The child was allowed to die, and “‘Nobody 
said a word,’ according to the . . . doctor. ‘I think it’s because we live in an 
era of the Body Beautiful, so the sight of a kid with almost nothing below 
the waist gave everybody pause.’”123 
The case was also described as making public a “private and personal 
plight.”124 Doctors expressed concern about legal supervision over (and 
possible sanctions for) medical decisionmaking, as well as the professional 
and ethical conflicts created by requests to hasten death. At the same time, 
medical advances were blamed for creating the painful situation in the first 
place. New technologies permitted life to continue, even as definitions of 
life and death shifted. Whether because of the mysteries of the human body 
or medical progress, terminal prognoses were also called into question. 
1. Twentieth-Century Euthanasia Movements 
The contemporary so-called “Right to Die” and “Death with Dignity” 
movements were not the first time Americans organized to promote 
euthanasia.125 Prior euthanasia advocates rejected the notion of spiritual 
transcendence in suffering, and their enthusiasm for science and human 
control led advocates to embrace euthanasia as part of a larger eugenics 
program of social improvement. Not only could those suffering find a 
peaceful death, but those burdened by severe mental or physical impairment 
 
119 Matt Clark, A Right to Die?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 3, 1975, at 58. 
120 Id. at 58–59. 
121 Id. at 59. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 67. 
124 Id. at 58. 
125 DOWBIGGIN, supra note 118, at 7–62. 
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could be killed as painlessly as possible, for their own good and the good of 
the larger society.126 Nazi euthanasia practices (and eugenic intent) exposed 
the dangers state-sanctioned euthanasia could pose for the socially 
vulnerable and marginalized, however, and consequently discredited the 
American movement’s framework of euthanasia as a tool for social 
improvement. As Americans learned of eugenics-inspired euthanasia 
programs conducted by German doctors, the American euthanasia 
movement became quiescent.127 The “rights” framework, however, emerged 
in the wake of the civil rights movements of the 1960s, and offered a 
powerful new discursive tool.128 
2. The Role of Organized Medicine in Contemporary Movements 
The rights framework reconfigured the American euthanasia 
movement from one oriented toward the good of society to one promoting 
the autonomy and dignity of the individual at a time when patients were 
demanding a more active role in their medical care.129 In addition, it created 
an avenue into court, an institution capable of putting pressure on the 
medical profession. The euthanasia movement has been credited with 
improving pain management specifically and palliative care more 
generally.130 At the same time, the legal rights-based framework accords 
doctors a legitimate presence in legal proceedings. Their ethical 
responsibilities and professional training, as well as their prognoses, 
position them as important interlocutors as courts decide these claims. 
Relatedly, the patient’s demands for autonomy—at the heart of the right to 
die conceptual framework—are dialogically related to the physician’s 
demands to direct how medical technology is to be used. 
3. Fear of the Slippery Slope 
Concerns about a slippery slope, where euthanasia is first intended to 
offer a choice to the suffering individual with a terminal illness, but then 
becomes a decision made by others for those not similarly afflicted, have 
both an historical and contemporary foundation. Historically, not only did 
the Nazi example demonstrate how socially vulnerable people could 
become the targets of nonvoluntary euthanasia, but statements by advocates 
 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 63–73. 
128 Id. at 97; GAILEY, supra note 118, at 127. 
129 See, e.g., DOWBIGGIN, supra note 118, at 111–15 (surveying range and sources of 
public disenchantment with organized medicine beginning in the 1970s). 
130 See, e.g., DANIEL HILLYARD & JOHN DOMBRINK, DYING RIGHT: THE DEATH WITH 
DIGNITY MOVEMENT 259 (2001). 
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for the American euthanasia movement at the beginning of the twentieth 
century clearly indicated they saw legislation permitting voluntary 
euthanasia for those facing death was simply a first step toward eventual 
embrace of nonvoluntary euthanasia for “monster” babies and individuals 
with mental and intellectual disabilities.131 
The New York Task Force132 expressed concern about a slippery slope, 
in light of the tension in compassion arguments: 
Policies limiting suicide to the terminally ill, for example, would be inconsistent with 
the notion that suicide is a compassionate choice for patients who are in pain or 
suffering. As long as the policies hinge on notions of pain or suffering, they are 
uncontainable; neither pain nor suffering can be gauged objectively, nor are they 
subject to the kind of judgments needed to fashion coherent public policy.133 
Reports from European countries where euthanasia is legal 
demonstrate the Task Force’s concerns were not farfetched. While disputed, 
some studies suggest that in the Netherlands at least some physicians have 
engaged in unsolicited euthanasia and complied with euthanasia requests 
from patients suffering from depression, but no physical ailment of any 
kind, much less one that would cause incurable physical deterioration.134 A 
recent study notes that a group of Belgian physicians favoring euthanasia 
also tend to support extending euthanasia to minors “who can value their 
interests.”135 
The New York State Task Force also expressed concern about a 
disproportionate impact of legalized euthanasia on poor people or members 
 
131 See, e.g., DOWBIGGIN, supra note 118, at 44 (advocate’s “support for euthanasia did 
not stop a voluntary mercy killing,” arguing it was “socially desirable” to kill “imbeciles and 
idiot infants and ‘monsters’”); id. at 47 (another advocate’s view that “purpose of euthanasia 
is to remove from society living creatures so monstrous, so deficient, so hopelessly insane 
that continued existence has for them no satisfactions and entails a heavy burden on 
society”); id. at 51 (“[s]upport for involuntary mercy killing [was] a fairly common attitude 
among early proponents of euthanasia”); id. at 57 (voluntary euthanasia bills seen as an 
“entering wedge”). 
132 The New York Task Force was convened in 1984 by then-Governor Mario M. 
Cuomo. Initially charged with exploring the public policy issues raised by advances in 
medical technology and life-sustaining treatment, it subsequently expanded its focus to 
include assisted suicide and euthanasia. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, 
supra note 78, at ix–5. 
133 Id. at xv.  
134 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997). But see Bregje D. 
Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al., Trends in End-Of-Life Practices Before and After the Enactment 
of the Euthanasia Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 2010: A Repeated Cross-sectional 
Survey, 380 LANCET 908, 908 (2012) (reporting slight decrease in euthanasia without explicit 
request). 
135 Joachim Cohen et al., Cultural Differences Affect Euthanasia Practice in Belgium: 
One Law but Different Attitudes and Practices in Flanders and Wallonia, 75 SOC. SCI. & 
MED. 845, 849 (2012). 
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of minority communities. In addition to disparities in access to medical and 
mental health care, the Task Force noted that care “will be practiced 
through the prism of social inequality and prejudice that characterizes the 
delivery of services in all segments of society, including health care. . . . 
[Physicians] are not exempt from the prejudices manifest in other areas.”136 
This raises the prospect that institutional structures and professionals may 
encourage disadvantaged individuals to seek euthanasia. 
4. Contemporary Legal Safeguards 
Vermont’s, Washington’s, and Oregon’s “Death with Dignity” statutes 
seek to meet at least some of physicians’ professional concerns by 
permitting physician-assisted suicide (where the physician only prescribes a 
lethal dose of medication), but not euthanasia (where the physician 
administers the lethal dose), and by requiring that the patient have “an 
incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and 
will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six 
months,” as attested to by two physicians.137 In addition, the Oregon and 
Washington statutes explicitly recognize depression can play a role in 
desires to hasten death, and Vermont, Oregon, and Washington limit 
physician-assisted suicide to those whose judgment is not impaired by 
mental illness.138 
 
136 N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 78, at 125.  
137 OR. REV. STAT. 127.800 §§ 1.01(12), 2.01 (2013); 18 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 113 §§ 
5281(a)(10), 5283(a), 5283(a)(7) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.245.010(13), 70.245.020 
(2011). In addition to limiting physician-assisted suicide to those with terminal illnesses, the 
statutes may also reflect criticisms of Dr. Kevorkian for helping individuals die without 
confirming that they were in fact ill. DOWBIGGIN, supra note 118, at 166.  
 138 OR. REV. STAT. 127.825 § 3.03 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE §70.245.060 (2011) 
(prohibiting assistance to any terminally ill individual who suffers from “a psychiatric or 
psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment”). While the evidence 
remains scant, a recent review article reported that a study conducted in Oregon found that 
20% of those requesting physician-assisted suicide exhibited symptoms of depression, and 
another found that 26% had such symptoms. In the first study, none was prescribed lethal 
medication; in the second, 17% (three people) were prescribed medication. Penney Lewis & 
Isra Black, Adherence to the Request Criterion in Jurisdictions Where Assisted Dying Is 
Lawful? A Review of the Criteria and Evidence in the Netherlands, Belgium, Oregon, and 
Switzerland, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 885, 889 (2013). “[T]he prevalence of depression in 
granted requests for [physician-assisted suicide] in Oregon appears to be lower than the rate 
in ungranted requests.” Id. at 894. 
 Foley emphasizes that the depression standing alone is insufficient; it must impair the 
patient’s judgment. While the severity of the depression clearly matters, substantial evidence 
indicates that depression can affect judgment. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Emotional 
Competence, ‘Rational Understanding,’ and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1375, 1408–16 (2006). 
180 MEREDITH MARTIN ROUNTREE [Vol. 105 
B. AMONG THE DEATH-SENTENCED 
1. Historical Context 
Conventional legal inquiry into appeal waivers usually begins with 
Rees v. Peyton: does the prisoner have the “capacity to appreciate his 
position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or 
abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering 
from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his 
capacity in the premises.”139 Melvin Rees himself sought to withdraw his 
Supreme Court appeal in 1965, as support for the death penalty waned.140 
Having failed to coax the parties into a negotiated resolution of the case, the 
Court ordered the lower court to adjudicate Rees’s competence.141 After 
multiple evaluations, the lower court found Rees incompetent, and the 
Supreme Court took no further formal action on the case.142 Only after 
Rees’s natural death in 1995 did the Court dismiss his case.143 
While this legal standard is widely cited, the contentious and insistent 
Gary Gilmore we saw at the beginning of this Article was ultimately more 
important in defining the modern volunteer. Much of Gilmore’s case seems 
peculiar to Gilmore—certainly no other volunteer inspired a Pulitzer Prize-
winning book, two television movies, the cover of a national newsweekly, a 
Saturday Night Live skit, and a pop song144—but in his case we see not only 
the seeds of future death penalty cases, but also legal logics that help 
explain how the Supreme Court came to take such a different view of death-
seeking prisoners and death-seeking patients. 
Gilmore, sentenced to death only months after the death penalty was 
reinstated in the United States,145 was not as easily put off as Rees. At a trial 
 
139 Rees v. Payton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966). 
140 STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY 244–47 (2002); Phyllis L. Crocker, Not to 
Decide Is to Decide: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Thirty-Year Struggle with One Case About 
Competency to Waive Death Penalty Appeals, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 885, 919–20 (2004). 
141 Crocker, supra note 140, at 900–01, 904–09, 921–22. 
142 Id. at 909–914, 918–19. As Crocker notes, during the pendency of Rees, the climate 
surrounding the death penalty changed. When the Supreme Court informally revisited the 
status of Rees in 1971, the Court was considering cases that could effectively have ended the 
unofficial moratorium on executions that spanned from 1967 to 1976. Id. at 922–23. 
143 Id. at 935. 
144 John H. Blume, Gilmore v. Utah: The Persistent Problem of ‘Volunteers’, in DEATH 
PENALTY STORIES 227 (John H. Blume and Jordan M. Steiker eds. 2009); Saturday Night 
Live (NBC television broadcast Dec. 11, 1976) (containing skit “Let’s Kill Gary Gilmore for 
Christmas”); THE ADVERTS, GARY GILMORE’S EYES (Anchor Records 1977). 
145 The Supreme Court in 1972 struck down multiple state death penalty statutes as 
violating the Eighth Amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In July 1976, the 
Supreme Court approved a number of revised statutes, permitting the death penalty to 
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court hearing after sentencing, Gilmore told the court, “You sentenced me 
to die. Unless it’s a joke or something, I want to go ahead and do it.”146 In a 
perfunctory hearing before the Utah Supreme Court, Gilmore, represented 
by counsel who assisted rather than opposed his efforts, testified that he 
knew he had a right to appeal; that he had told his attorneys that he did not 
want to appeal; that he had told him during the trial that if found guilty, he 
would prefer death to imprisonment; and that he preferred to keep the 
originally scheduled execution date.147 Despite protests from Gilmore’s 
prior lawyer, no formal mental competency or waiver hearing was 
conducted.148 
Less than five months after his crime and two months after his 
sentencing, Gilmore’s case went before the Supreme Court.149 Gilmore’s 
mother, Bessie Gilmore, proceeded in the Court as a “next friend” to stay 
his execution, arguing that he was not competent to knowingly and 
intelligently waive his rights. Bessie Gilmore’s stay application informed 
the Court of “petitioner’s history of suicidal tendencies, his November 16, 
1976, suicide attempt, and his repeated request to be executed [to] indicate 
that petitioner’s original waiver of appeal is an attempt to commit 
suicide.”150 It cited psychiatric sources discussing the “impulse to suicide as 
a form of mental illness.”151 
The Attorney General responded that Gilmore’s post-trial suicide 
attempt was not pathological, but simply an “attempt [] to effectuate the 
sentence himself.”152 His desire to die was rational: “Mr. Gilmore had 
sufficient experience of prison life that he was able to form an accurate 
estimation of what it would be like for him to languish in prison.”153 
Gilmore should be accorded the “right to make a rational choice within the 
framework of his circumstances and personal philosophical constructs.”154 
In addition to having a markedly swifter adjudication than Rees, 
Gilmore set up a very different mental health contest. Where Rees was 
 
proceed. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Gilmore committed his capital crime on July 19 and 20, 
1976, and he was sentenced to death on October 7, 1976. Blume, supra note 144, at 204. 
146 MAILER, supra note 95, at 467. 
147 Blume, supra note 144, at 213. 
148 Id . 
149 Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). 
150 Application for a Stay of Execution at 31, In re Gilmore, No. A-453 (U.S. Dec. 2, 
1976) [hereinafter “Stay App”]. 
151 Id. at 31–32. 
152 Response to Application for Stay of Execution at 57, In re Gilmore, No. A-453 (U.S. 
Dec. 7, 1976) [hereinafter “Stay Resp.”]. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
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delusional and psychotic,155 the Gilmore litigation instead focused on rival 
interpretations of his suicidality and its implications for his competence to 
waive his appeals.156 
The Supreme Court stayed Gilmore’s execution on December 3, 1976, 
to give it time to review certain documents. Ten days later, it lifted the stay, 
summarily finding that Gilmore was mentally competent and had made a 
knowing and intelligent waiver.157 Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall 
dissented, complaining that without appellate review, no one could know 
whether the Utah death penalty statute was constitutional.158 According to 
the dissents, this question needed to be resolved since Gilmore could not, 
under the Eighth Amendment, consent to an unconstitutional punishment.159 
Justice Marshall’s dissent paints a picture of informal, rushed, and (in 
his view) unreliable proceedings. The experts—all of whom worked for the 
State—had never been subjected to adversarial examination, and portions of 
the transcript regarding defense counsel’s opinion of Gilmore’s competence 
and legal claims were not transcribed.160 In Gilmore's case, we see problems 
plaguing the adjudication of volunteers, at least in Texas.161 Questionable 
mental health assessments and nonadversarial proceedings are accepted. 
Desires to hasten execution can stand alongside suicide attempts without 
defeating competence. The mother’s interest in preventing execution is 
entirely contingent on the competency finding. The state interest in the 
legality of the conviction and sentence was a concern to no one but the 
dissenters. 
Executing Gilmore also provided death penalty proponents with the 
opportunity to demonstrate the necessity of the death penalty. As Blume 
points out, Gilmore presented none of the familiar concerns about the death 
penalty. He was white, unrehabilitated after repeated stints in prison, and 
not plainly mentally ill. He appeared intelligent, remorseless, and 
obnoxious, and he admitted guilt consistent with other compelling evidence. 
Add to that the fact that Utah did not have the cultural baggage of the 
 
155 See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 140, at 914 (footnotes omitted) (“At the evidentiary 
hearing, Rees ‘was unkempt and required constant attention lest he take his clothes off in the 
courtroom.’ He repeatedly interrupted the proceedings with ‘unrelated and incoherent 
statements.’”).  
156 Stay App., supra note 150, at 31–32. 
157 Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976). 
158 Id. at 1017–18 (White, J., dissenting). 
159 Id.; id. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
160 Id. at 1019–20 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
161 Rountree, Accounts, supra note 8, at 605–07, 609–14.  
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former Confederacy, Gilmore became, “in many respects, the perfect person 
to usher in the new era of executions.”162 
Blume argues that “the path was set” when the Supreme Court 
permitted Gilmore to waive his appeals.163 Without disputing Blume’s view 
of the contingent importance of Gilmore, the larger sociopolitical context 
helped cement and extend the Court’s decision. The 1970s witnessed 
important shifts in the American criminal justice system. The mobilization 
of pro-death-penalty activists after Furman v. Georgia164 struck down 
several states’ death penalty statutes, and the rise of “law and order” politics 
alongside more retributive penal policies have been chronicled elsewhere.165 
Certainly Gilmore, with his extensive juvenile and adult history of crime 
and imprisonment, fit nicely within the then-contemporary disenchantment 
with the rehabilitation model.166 
Simultaneously, the Supreme Court was in the middle of the 
contentious debate regarding rights held by those accused of crimes. Most 
relevant here is the Court’s landmark decision in Faretta v. California.167 In 
Faretta, the Supreme Court decided that individuals have a constitutional 
right to represent themselves in criminal proceedings. They must not be 
required to have a lawyer “force[d]” upon them, even at a cost of a less 
reliable proceeding: “[A]lthough he may conduct his own defense 
ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of that 
respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.”168 
The dissenters inveighed against this individualistic stance that it 
believed would undermine the criminal justice system as a whole: 
That goal [of justice] is ill-served, and the integrity of and public confidence in the 
system are undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due to the defendant’s 
ill-advised decision to waive counsel. The damage thus inflicted is not mitigated by 
the lame explanation that the defendant simply availed himself of the ‘freedom’ ‘to go 
 
162 Blume, supra note 144, at 226. 
163 Id. at 228. 
164 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
165 See, e.g., BANNER, supra note 140, at 267–84; DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR 
INSTITUTION 231–55 (2010); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 116–30 (2007). 
166 See, e.g., Todd R. Clear and Aaron Ho, An Essay: The First 50 Years of the Journal of 
Research in Crime and Delinquency, 51 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 402, 406–07 (2014) 
(discussing the influence of Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About 
Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974)). One television writer reportedly said at the time that 
Gilmore’s case was “an open commentary on the utter failure of our prison system to 
rehabilitate anybody.” MAILER, supra note 95, at 572. 
167 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
168 Id. at 834 (internal citations and punctuation omitted). 
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to jail under his own banner.’ The system of criminal justice should not be available 
as an instrument of self-destruction.169 
These multiple historical, social, and legal strands combined to give 
Gilmore a symbolic importance extending beyond a message that the death 
penalty was once again a punishment available to states. When the Supreme 
Court refused to stay Gilmore’s execution, it may also have been signaling 
that it would limit the reach of cause lawyers170 by strengthening the agency 
of the condemned individual, to the exclusion of broader systemic 
considerations. 
In addition, as Gilmore himself noted in his reference to Karen Ann 
Quinlan quoted at the beginning of this Article, his desire to hasten death 
was situated within a cultural moment when a discourse of rational death 
and a right to die gained national prominence against a backdrop of the civil 
rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s.171 
2. Logic of Death Penalty Law 
The different legal logics of death penalty and terminal illness also 
contribute to different outcomes. Where decisions to hasten death in the 
context of medical interventions require weighing state interests against the 
individual’s desire, volunteers require no such balancing. Because a death-
sentenced prisoner’s desire to hasten death is conceptualized solely within 
the framework of rules and waiver, the concerns that we see in the context 
of the right to die of the terminally ill cannot penetrate. 
Significantly, the fact that this waiver occurs in the context of the 
death penalty may strengthen the logic of rules, rather than diminish it. 
While the idea that “death is different” is fundamental to Eighth 
Amendment death penalty jurisprudence, it is usually operationalized 
through procedural safeguards, like rules. David Garland argues that 
American death penalty law evolved to distance the death penalty from 
lynching.172 One strategy included “rationalizing and juridifying”173 the 
 
169 Id. at 839–40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (internal citations and punctuation omitted). 
170 Gilmore’s mother was represented by Anthony Amsterdam. He exemplified the anti-
death-penalty cause lawyer, having argued Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). By the 
time of Gilmore’s case, he had appeared before the Supreme Court in at least five other 
death penalty cases. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972); McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). 
171 HILLYARD & DOMBRINK, supra note 130, at 8–9.  
172 GARLAND, supra note 165, at 34–35 (“the contemporary American death penalty has, 
in important respects been designed to be an antilynching . . . . For all the inversions of form, 
the social forces and political processes that enabled lynchings, mobilized lynch mobs, and 
made lynchings useful for political actors have somehow persisted and continue to structure 
the modern death penalty’s deployment and utility.”). 
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application of the death penalty.174 The Supreme Court, Garland explains, 
developed a “discipline of legal rules and procedural propriety” to “us[e] 
the values of liberalism (rule-based restraints on state power, respect for the 
individual, due process, legality) to reshape America’s capital punishment 
practice.”175 The existence of rules and procedures, in other words, 
contribute to constituting a legitimate death penalty. Hand in hand with a 
logic of rules is the idea that rules can be waived, provided, of course, that 
the waiver follows certain rules. The waiver model works well—indeed, it 
can only exist—within a discourse of rules. It acknowledges the existence 
of rules, even as the individual invokes a desire not to take advantage of 
them. 
This conceptualization shapes the function of mental illness, as is plain 
in the Gilmore Supreme Court litigation. Both the application for a stay of 
execution filed by Gilmore’s mother and the response from the Attorney 
General of Utah spoke directly to Gilmore’s efforts to kill himself.176 The 
desire to hasten death, however, was legally relevant only to the extent that 
it signified mental illness that undercut the validity of the waiver. Bessie 
Gilmore’s stay application argued that “[t]o permit a man to kill himself 
through legal process by his lack of rational choice affronts a most basic 
sense of justice,” and specified that a proper waiver is the mechanism for 
protecting justice.177 It did not draw on, for example, the historical 
proscriptions on suicide elaborately described by the Supreme Court in 
Glucksberg.178 The waiver model reconfigures the relevance of mental 
illness such that it relates only to the ability to waive, not to the desire to 
die. 
3. Cultural Frames of Mental Illness and Criminality 
The legal marginalization of mental distress among condemned 
prisoners may reflect a larger cultural ambivalence regarding depression as 
a form of mental illness.179 At least in the criminal context, the law also 
 
173 Garland defines juridification as “the regulation of state power by reference to legal 
rules and procedures.” Id. at 264. Other strategies included “civilizing and humanizing” the 
punishment by, e.g., excluding juveniles or those mentally ill at execution, and 
“democratizing and localizing” by shifting death penalty decisions to local participants. Id. at 
268–80. 
174 Id. at 262. 
175 Id. at 263–65. 
176 Stay App., supra note 150, at 31–32; Stay Resp., supra note 152, at 56–57. 
177 Stay App., supra note 150, at 32 (internal punctuation omitted). 
178 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–15 (1997). 
179 David Pilgrim, The Survival of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 65 SOC. SCI. & MED. 536, 542 
(2007). 
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generally fails to acknowledge the impact of impaired affective (as opposed 
to cognitive) states on decisionmaking.180 Certainly Melvin Rees, with his 
delusional thinking and psychotic preoccupations, conformed more closely 
to widespread ideas of what mental illness looks like than did Gary 
Gilmore.181 Notably, the Supreme Court has expressed greater concern over 
the reliability of the procedures to evaluate mental competency in both Ford 
v. Wainwright182 and Panetti v. Quarterman,183 both of which involved 
prisoners with serious delusions, than it has in volunteer cases.184 
This difference in interpreting depression may also reflect a bias 
against recognizing mental dysfunction in criminals as it contradicts 
prevalent ideas about criminal intentionality and autonomy.185 A Newsweek 
magazine cover featuring Gary Gilmore trades in romantic notions of death 
seeking.186 Gilmore looks directly at the camera, with what could be 
construed as a perhaps rakish, perhaps slightly menacing, grin on his face. 
He wears a short-sleeved prison jumpsuit that reveals handcuffs and his 
tattooed forearms. “Death Wish” is stamped in red on Gilmore’s torso. It is 
easy to read into the image that Gilmore has a “death wish” because he is a 
thrill-seeking outlaw, not because he is depressed and sees no point to 
living. 
Perhaps tapping into these assumptions about free will is the 
persistence of the metaphor of “volunteer” to describe execution-hastening 
death-sentenced prisoners. The word “volunteer” amplifies connotations of 
 
180 Maroney, supra note 138, at 1400 (“[T]o the extent that examiners and courts 
sometimes reveal their conception of the distinction between a ‘rational’ and ‘factual’ 
understanding, it appears clear that the generally operative concept of Dusky rationality is 
focused almost entirely on disordered cognitive processes, such as those seen in thought 
disorder. The role of emotional disorder, though sometimes mentioned, remains almost 
entirely unexplored. Indeed, it is sometimes deliberately disregarded.” (footnote omitted)). 
181 Bruce G. Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: Labels, Causes, 
Dangerousness, and Social Distance, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1328, 1331 (1999) (finding 
study respondents significantly more likely to identify schizophrenia as “mental illness” than 
depression). 
182 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
183 551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
184 These cases also involved a different legal question: competency to be executed. 
Among other things, and generally unlike the Texas volunteer cases, this meant that the 
prisoners’ lawyers sought genuinely adversarial proceedings to test the mental health 
evidence.  
185 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 184 (2001); Daniel LaChance, Last Words, Last Meals, and Last 
Stands: Agency and Individuality in the Modern Execution Process, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
701, 703–04 (2007). 
186 This image can be viewed at https://www.etsy.com/listing/62736758/gary-gilmore-
cover-newsweek-november-29, archived at https://perma.cc/ZRC5-JQTG. 
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free will and suggests a kind of civic-mindedness. Conversely, the notions 
of helplessness and passivity embedded in the “sick role,”187 as well as the 
historical ghosts of euthanasia, may inhibit our calling those using the 
Vermont, Oregon, and Washington statutes “volunteers.” As Thibodeau, 
McClelland, and Boroditsky’s experimental work found, metaphors shape 
our understanding of the underlying social problem, as well as its 
solution.188 
IV. PROPOSED ANALYSIS FOR ADJUDICATING REQUESTS TO EXPEDITE 
EXECUTION 
Explaining why the law treats these desires to die so differently does 
not justify the different legal approaches. I propose a legal standard that 
acknowledges that many of the issues surrounding desires to die are similar, 
whether one is imprisoned or not—with one important exception. Where 
assisted-death is illegal in most states, I do not propose an equivalent ban 
on the execution of volunteers. While this may be the more consistent 
approach, I recognize that it is an impractical position at this time. Instead, I 
offer a way to ameliorate, if not eliminate, the disparity in how the law 
treats desires to die. 
Using the right to die in the medical context as a template, the standard 
for volunteers should consider state interests regarding the preservation of 
life, prevention of suicide, interests of innocent third parties, and 
implications for a profession (here reconceptualized to include the 
individual lawyer and the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole). In 
addition, prison institutional considerations should be integrated into the 
 
187 In the 1950s, sociologist Talcott Parsons theorized the “sick role” which, among other 
things, situated the patient as passive, helpless, and subordinate to the expert physician. “The 
sick patient is in a situation of ‘helplessness’ and ‘technical incompetence’, being ‘liable to a 
whole series of irr- and non-rational beliefs and practices.’” Chris Shilling, Culture, the ‘Sick 
Role’ and the Consumption of Health, 53 BRIT. J. SOC. 621, 628 (2002). Parsons’ 
characterization of the sick as passive has been countered by empirical work on more agentic 
and empowered patients, particularly with the growth of other areas of purported expertise, 
such as the Internet. Michele Crossley, ‘Sick Role’ or ‘Empowerment’? The Ambiguities of 
Life with an HIV Positive Diagnosis, 20 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 507, 509–10 (1998); 
Shilling, supra, at 628, 631; Matthias Zick Varul, Talcott Parsons, the Sick Role and 
Chronic Illness, 16 BODY & SOC’Y 72, 72–73 (2010). In the context of this Article, where the 
focus is less on the patient’s sense of empowerment and agency, and more on the state’s 
view of the patient, the sick role may continue to animate the state’s response since the state 
is posited as the individual’s protector, with the burden being on the patient (or his or her 
surrogates) to overcome the notion that the patient wants this particular kind of “protection.” 
Shilling, supra, at 628. 
188 Paul Thibodeau et al., When a Bad Metaphor May Not Be a Victimless Crime: The 
Role of Metaphor in Social Policy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 31ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY 809–14 (N. A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn eds., 2009).  
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analysis, as they are in the prisoner medical care cases. Finally, to ensure a 
genuinely adversarial proceeding in which the full range of the state’s 
interests is presented to the court, independent counsel should be appointed. 
A. STATE’S INTEREST IN PREVENTING SUICIDE AND PRESERVING LIFE 
As the data described above make clear, the risk of suicidality in the 
volunteer population is real and should be integrated into the legal analysis. 
Mental health information should not simply affect the validity of the 
waiver, but should also be taken into account in assessments of impaired 
judgment and the will to live more generally. 
Further, while Timothy Kaufman-Osborne argues that the prisoner dies 
at the pronouncement of sentence,189 this is true in only the most symbolic 
sense. The state has an interest in even the life of the death-sentenced 
prisoner. The Eighth Amendment guarantees of food, essentially safe and 
clean shelter, clothing, and medical care extend to the death-sentenced as 
much as they do to other prisoners.190 Some prisons have rules prohibiting a 
mentally competent prisoner from hurting himself or from permitting 
another to hurt him.191 
California death row prisoner Clarence Allen’s attempt to refuse 
medical treatment lays bare the contradictions in how and when prisoners 
have rights to die. Allen, an elderly prisoner with significant health 
problems and physical disabilities, suffered a heart attack about three 
 
189 TIMOTHY V. KAUFMAN-OSBORN, FROM NOOSE TO NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND 
THE LATE LIBERAL STATE 13–45 (Univ. of Michigan Press 2002). 
190 See, e.g., Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the fact 
that prisoner–patient was on death row was an improper motive for denying medical care); 
Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 332 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that clean and safe shelter, food, 
clothing, and medical care are required by Eighth Amendment). 
191 See, e.g., TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUSTICE, Self-Inflicted Bodily Injury for Secondary 
Gain or Threatening to Self-Inflict Bodily Injury, in DISCIPLINARY RULES AND PROCEDURES 
FOR OFFENDERS C-2 (2012), available at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/documents/cid/
Disciplinary_Rules_and_Procedures_for_Offenders_English.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/YM28-YWQ2. 
Physical injury to an offender’s body that is self-inflicted or inflicted by others with 
the offender’s permission, or assisting another offender in mutilating the offender’s 
body, absent a determination by a mental health professional that the offender’s 
behavior is the result of a mental condition, or threatening to self-inflict bodily injury.  
Some systems are abandoning punishment for self-harm. See Austin Jenkins, Washington 
Prisons Will No Longer Punish Inmates for ‘Self-Harm’, NW NEWS NETWORK (July 3, 
2014), http://nwnewsnetwork.org/post/washington-prisons-will-no-longer-punish-inmates-
self-harm, archived at http://perma.cc/T5FS-8Y8J (citing Washington and Vermont prison 
systems). 
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months before his scheduled execution.192 The Associated Press reported 
that: 
Having suffered a heart attack in September, Allen had asked prison authorities to let 
him die if he went into cardiac arrest before his execution, a request prison officials 
said they would not honor. 
“We would resuscitate him,” said prison spokesman Vernell Crittendon, then execute 
him. 193 
This is consistent with case law. A few courts have permitted prisoners to 
refuse treatment,194 but generally courts have allowed prisoners to intervene 
forcefully when prisoners try to die, citing the state’s interest in preserving 
life and preventing suicide. 195In In re Caulk,196 the prison sought to force-
feed a prisoner facing life without parole in prison.  
The prisoner had decided to stop eating because he: 
[N]ever expects to be released from prison again. He says he is tired, unhappy, 
disappointed with the promise that life holds, that he does not ‘belong on the streets.’ 
He maintains that if he cannot live freely, he does not want to live at all . . . . He 
testified that he has hurt a lot of people, and whenever he feels pain on his starvation 
diet, he believes he is paying another debt for his past misdeeds.197 
Caulk offered to release the prison from any liability for his death, and 
did not appear to the court to be starving himself for any secondary gain, 
such as a transfer to another prison.198 The court acknowledged that Caulk 
 
192 Dan Glaister, California Executes Clarence Ray Allen, 76, GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2006 
7:09 PM EST), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/18/usa.danglaister, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AP8Z-MVWY; Henry Weinstein and Hector Becerra, California Executes 
Death Row Inmate, 76, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jan/17/
local/me-allen17, archived at http://perma.cc/6RF3-DUGH  
193 Associated Press, Senior Prisoner on California’s Death Row Is Executed at Age 76, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/
01/17/AR2006011701327.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4CT5-SEDE. 
194 See, e.g., Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 380–83, (Cal. 1993); Comm’r. of 
Corr. v. Turner, 2006 WL 453465 at *3 (Mass. 2006). 
195 See, e.g., Polk Cty. Sheriff v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk Cty., 594 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 
1999) (permitting involuntary dialysis); Comm’r. of Corr. v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 
1979) (same). See generally Arlene McCarthy, Prisoner’s Right to Die or Refuse Medical 
Treatment, 66 A.L.R.5th 111 (1999); Daniel R.H. Mendelsohn, The Right to Refuse: Should 
Prison Inmates Be Allowed to Discontinue Treatment for Incurable, Noncommunicable 
Medical Conditions?, 71 MD. L. REV. 295 (2011); Peter Wood, The Right to Refuse Medical 
Treatment: Courts’ Disparate Treatment of Incarcerated Patients, 112 PENN. L. REV. 1167 
(2008).  
196 480 A.2d 93 (N.H. 1984). 
197 Id. at 95. 
198 Id. Caulk and the other cases discussed in this section differ from most hunger strike 
cases insofar as the prisoners in this section were not trying to make a statement or extract a 
concession from the prison administration. In those cases, courts generally side with the 
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had a state constitutional right to privacy protecting him from “unwanted 
infringements of bodily integrity,” but, since “no constitutional right is 
absolute,” it weighed Caulk’s constitutional right against the state’s 
interests.199 The court concluded: 
Although the defendant contends that he is allowing himself to die, rather than 
committing suicide, it is important to note what this case does not involve. This is not 
a situation where an individual, facing death from a terminal illness, chooses to avoid 
extraordinary and heroic measures to prolong his life, albeit for a short duration. 
Rather, the defendant has set the death-producing agent in motion with the specific 
intent of causing his own death, and any comparison of the two situations is 
superficial. Thus, in these circumstances, the State’s interest in preserving life and 
preventing suicide dominates.200 
In Laurie v. Senecal,201 the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered  
whether a healthy adult male prisoner . . . has a constitutional right to end his life by 
starvation as long as he has no dependents who might suffer as a result of his demise 
and as long as he is not suffering from any psychotic or delusional condition and is 
not using his self-impelled starvation as a means of extracting concessions from the 
director.202  
The prisoner had no physical ailment. He simply “no longer desired to live 
because of the stigma of his conviction” and felt “continuous psychological 
pain” because of his crime.203 Despite finding the prisoner was competent, 
“had made a knowing and voluntary decision to stop taking food and water 
for the purpose of ending his life,” and had no dependents who would suffer 
from his death, the court found the prison had a “right and duty to 
intervene” 204 because of the state’s interest in preserving life and 
preventing suicide. “In respect to an incarcerated prisoner, we believe that 
 
prison. See, e.g., Weinschenker v. Avolio, No. 06-CV-0405, 2006 U.S. Dist. WL 897740 
(W.D. Pa. 2006); In re Soliman, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2001); Lantz v. Coleman, 
No. HHDCV084034912, 2010 WL 1494985 (Conn. Super. Mar. 9, 2010); Ill. Dep’t of Corr. 
v. Millard, 782 N.E.2d 966 (Ill. App. 2003); State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. 
Va. 1982); see also Comm’r. of Corr. v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979) (construing 
dialysis refusal as effort to obtain transfer to lower security prison). But see Singletary v. 
Costello, 665 So.2d 1099 (Fla. App. Dist. 1996) (denying prison permission to forcefeed); 
Hill v. Dep’t of Corr., 992 A.2d 933 (Pa. 2010) (authorizing invasive medical tests, but 
holding that prison failed to meet evidentiary burden to forcefeed). For a discussion of the 
relevance of Cruzan and Glucksberg to prison hunger strikes, see Mara Silver, Testing 
Cruzan: Prisoners and the Constitutional Question of Self-Starvation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 631 
(2005). 
199 In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 95 (internal citations omitted).  
200 Id. at 97 (internal citations omitted). 
201 666 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1995). 
202 Id. at 808. 
203 Id. at 807. 
204 Id. at 807–08. 
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there is no right under either the State or the Federal Constitution to 
override the compelling interest of the state in the preservation of his or her 
life and the prevention of suicide.”205  
In Maine, a court permitted a jail to force-feed a prisoner who 
“refus[ed] to take life-sustaining sustenance as a result of a sense of 
hopelessness.”206 The court reasoned that the sheriff of the jail had “the 
obligation to take reasonable measures to maintain the wellbeing of 
individuals in his custody.”207The Seventh Circuit limited prisoners’ right to 
refuse medical treatment by referring to the psychological impact of 
incarceration (and the state’s duty to mitigate that impact).208 
Free people who are sane have a liberty interest in refusing life-saving medical 
treatment, and likewise in refusing to eat, a method by which some elderly people 
commit suicide. But either prisoners don’t have such an interest, or it is easily 
overridden.  
The reasons are practical. (No longer does one hear that prisoners must not be allowed 
to evade punishment by killing themselves and thus “cheating the gallows.”) . . . 
Prison officials who let prisoners starve themselves to death would also expose 
themselves to lawsuits by the prisoners’ estates. Reckless indifference to the risk of a 
prisoner’s committing suicide is a standard basis for a federal civil rights suit. The 
idea behind liability in such cases is that incarceration can place a person under 
unusual psychological strain and the jail or prison under a commensurate duty to 
prevent the prisoner from giving way to the strain. The analysis is applicable when 
suicide takes the form of starving oneself to death.209 
The remorse, hopelessness, and stress of incarceration articulated in 
these cases are strikingly similar to the reasons many death row volunteers 
give for wanting to die.210 In the death row context, of course, these reasons 
are accepted.  
Finally, in the context of the death penalty, accepting the prisoner’s 
reason for wanting to hasten execution is also legally questionable. Not 
only should this be irrelevant, as Anthony Casey states bluntly, 211 but this 
 
205 Id. at 809. 
206 Ross v. Emerson, No. CV-05-262, 2005 WL 3340087, at *1 (Me. Super. Nov. 3, 
2005) (order denying motion to dissolve temporary restraining order). 
207 Id. at *2. 
208 Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2006). 
209 Id. at 546–47 (internal citations omitted). The California Supreme Court notably 
rejected the idea that liability could attach in the face of the prisoner’s waiver of nutrition 
and hydration. Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 386–87 (Cal. 1993). 
210 Rountree, Accounts, supra note 8, at 601–03. 
211 Casey, supra note 5, at 99 (“This is irrelevant. There is no right to choose death over 
imprisonment. And there is especially no right to choose a punishment otherwise prohibited 
by the Constitution.”). 
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argument contains no principle limiting lethal injection to death-sentenced 
prisoners.  
For non-death-sentenced prisoners, courts reject the notion that 
hopelessness or a desire to atone for one’s crimes entitled a prisoner to 
hasten death. Instead, courts impose a duty on the state to maintain life. 
Further, echoing Casey’s argument, courts find that whether and when to 
die is simply not for the prisoner to decide. In confronting a prisoner’s 
request for expedited execution, courts should weigh the state’s strong 
interest in keeping volunteers alive, as it does with other prisoners. 
B. INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 
The prisoner cases frequently invoke concerns regarding the orderly 
administration of the prison.212 In McNabb v. Department of Corrections, 
the Washington Supreme Court considered the case of Charles McNabb 
who sought to refuse force-feeding by the prison.213 The prison began force-
feeding him after he “had not eaten voluntarily for over five months.”214 
The plurality opinion noted that the prisoner was neither “terminally ill” nor 
“debilitated by disease”; McNabb wanted only to have his fast “take its 
course” to his death.215 While recognizing McNabb had a “limited right to 
refuse artificial means of nutrition and hydration,” the court noted that it 
was “subject to the goals and policies of the prison system.”216 The prison’s 
interest was “an additional state interest that should be considered.”217 
Further, courts should defer to prison administrators’ assessments of the 
risks to institutional security and order.218 The plurality concluded: 
Therefore, the court will weigh McNabb’s right to refuse artificial means of nutrition 
and hydration against the existence of five compelling state interests: (1) the 
maintenance of security and orderly administration within the prison system, (2) the 
preservation of life, (3) the protection of innocent third parties, (4) the prevention of 
suicide, and (5) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.219 
 
212 See, e.g., Stouffer v. Reid, 993 A.2d 104 (Md. 2010); Comm’r. of Corr. v. Myers, 399 
N.E.2d 452, 458–59 (Mass. 1979); In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 96 (N.H. 1984). 
213 McNabb v. Dep’t of Corr., 180 P.3d 1257 (Wash. 2008). 
214 Id. at 1259. 
215 Id. at 1260. 
216 Id. at 1264. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 1264–65. Even the justices who concurred only in the judgment found the 
prisoner’s right to refuse medical treatment was constrained: 
Prisoners who are otherwise healthy have no right to refuse artificial means of nutrition and 
hydration in an effort to end their lives. Contrary to the inference of the dissent, Charles McNabb 
is not conducting a hunger strike—he is attempting to commit suicide. The extraordinary 
intervention in this case was initiated only when medical staff issued a written determination that 
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This interest should be weighed in the case of volunteers, as well. 
While the data are not clear whether or how prison security may be 
disrupted by volunteers, researchers have observed that suicides can occur 
in clusters, and can be “contagious” insofar as one suicide may “facilitate 
the occurrence of a subsequent suicide.”220 This raises the question whether 
one individual’s decision to hasten execution could affect others. Blume 
reports that many attorneys believe execution hastening is contagious, and 
Blume’s data tentatively suggest that contagion could be a dynamic 
affecting decisions to hasten execution.221 If such a dynamic is at work, it 
portends a systematic degradation of the legal process, as well as the 
possibility of increased depression and hopelessness. This could increase 
the burden on prison mental health staff. Courts should therefore inquire 
into the impact of a particular volunteer’s execution on the larger death row 
population. 
C. STATE’S INTEREST IN PROTECTING INNOCENT THIRD PARTIES 
The Death with Dignity statutes do not provide a voice for third 
parties, and this may well reflect the fact that the weight of this factor has 
receded in importance in the passive euthanasia cases.222 It may also reflect 
the fact that the Death with Dignity statutes narrow the group of people who 
may avail themselves of the law. Individuals must be within six months of 
death. 
For otherwise healthy people, such as the prisoner in Laurie v. 
Senecal, this concern may be more prominent. In the context of the social 
ties of death row prisoners, empirical research suggests that volunteers as a 
group are not dramatically more socially isolated than those who pursue 
their appeals. The existence of “execution impact” evidence, i.e., testimony 
from the capital defendant’s loved ones about the negative effect his 
execution would have on them at trial also suggests the existence of 
 
McNabb’s health was threatened. McNabb has no right to starve himself to death by refusing 
sustenance while in the custody of the State—this is not a privacy right that citizens of the state 
hold or expect to hold. 
Id. at 1267 (Madsen, J., concurring). 
220 Madelyn S. Gould et al., Suicide Clusters: A Critical Review, 19 SUICIDE & LIFE-
THREATENING BEHAV. 17, 18 (1989); Matthew K. Nock et al., Suicide and Suicidal Behavior, 
30 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 133, 145 (2008) (identifying suicidal behavior among peers as a 
risk factor for suicide). 
221 Blume, supra note 6, at 964. The Texas data suggest that it is difficult to disentangle 
contagion from other influences on decisions to be executed. Rountree, supra note 73, at 67–
71. 
222 The New Mexico opinion striking down the physician-assisted death ban, by contrast, 
repeatedly noted the impact of the death on family members and loved ones. Morris v. 
Brandenberg, No. D-202-CV 2012-02909, at 6, 12 (2d Jud. Dist. N.M. Jan. 13, 2014).  
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comparable evidence when execution is a more proximate reality.223 
Nevertheless, these family ties are disregarded in waiver adjudications. The 
voices of mothers, fathers, children, and spouses should be included and 
weighed in the court’s adjudication.  
D. STATE’S INTEREST IN THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND 
LEGAL PROFESSION 
 The state has multiple interests specific to the operation of the legal 
system in capital cases. First, it must ensure the legitimacy of the death-
sentencing process. Second, it must create legal structures enable individual 
lawyers to act ethically.  
1. The Legitimacy of the Death Penalty System 
As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed, the state has “an interest 
in the reliability and integrity of a death sentencing decision.”224 This 
concern has led scholars to propose legal standards that protect this interest. 
Anthony Casey advocates a standard whereby the state’s interest diminishes 
as appeals are pursued and (from the prisoner’s perspective) lost. Casey 
bases his argument in part on his contention that the chance of error 
diminishes as the case proceeds.225 This in turn increases the state’s 
confidence in the reliability and integrity of the death sentence. Evolutions 
in the law governing capital appeals undermine the assumption that the 
chance of error decreases as appeals progress. Certainly federal judges with 
 
223 See Wayne A. Logan, When Balance and Fairness Collide: An Argument for 
Execution Impact Evidence in Capital Trials, 33 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1 (1999). As Logan 
notes, execution impact evidence “permits jurors to recognize in a visceral way that their 
capital decision does not occur in a vacuum—that the life they may decide to take perhaps 
has had, and perhaps will continue to have, some positive effect on others.” Id. at 52. 
224 State v. Martini, 677 A.2d 1106, 1107 (N.J. 1996). In dissenting from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gilmore v. Utah, Justice Marshall expressed this interest more pungently: 
“[T]he Eighth Amendment not only protects the right of individuals not to be victims of 
cruel and unusual punishment, but that it also expresses a fundamental interest of society in 
ensuring that state authority is not used to administer barbaric punishments.” 429 U.S. at 
1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
225 Casey, supra note 5, at 101, 103.  
The interest in restricting defendants from volunteering for execution is derived from the state’s 
responsibility to prevent the inconsistent or inappropriate application of the death sentence. . . . 
Each stage of the proceedings serves as a safeguard against an inappropriate death sentence and 
the danger of such a sentence diminishes as the case proceeds through each stage. . . .  
. . . .  
Every stage serves as a checkpoint, an additional safeguard filtering out the impurities. 
Id. For a contrary view, see, e.g., DAVID R. DOW, EXECUTED ON A TECHNICALITY: LETHAL 
INJUSTICE ON AMERICA’S DEATH ROW 52–86 (2005).  
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life tenure may have a different perspective from elected state judges,226 the 
quality of counsel can improve, and new evidence may come to light as the 
case proceeds. Given the current direction of federal habeas law, however, 
the more defensible justification for the changing balance is the state’s 
diminishing interest in ensuring the accuracy of the process. The Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act227 and the body of habeas corpus 
law that has evolved in its wake have narrowed the scope of federal judicial 
review, raised the prisoner’s evidentiary burden, and limited the federal 
courts’ ability to grant the prisoner relief as compared to state courts and to 
pre-AEDPA federal powers.228 These restrictions reflect the current view 
that the state’s interest in correcting error decreases as its interest in finality 
increases.229 
Conversely, the state’s interest is highest in the early stages of the 
process, namely at trial.230 Arguments that death-sentenced individuals 
simply choose the timing of their punishment, not the punishment itself,231 
are undermined by cases in which people facing the death penalty prevented 
a full and fair hearing at the guilt/innocence and punishment phases of trial. 
In the Texas study, some volunteers asked the jury for the death penalty, 
barred presentation of mitigating evidence, halted cross-examination of 
hostile witnesses, or required counsel to pick a pro-death-penalty jury.232 In 
 
226 Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Habeas 
Corpus Review by Independent Federal Judges Is Indispensable to Protecting Constitutional 
Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1826–32 (2000). 
227 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). 
228 See generally Larry Yackle, AEDPA Mea Culpa, 24 FED. SENT. RPTR. 328, 331–33 
(2012) (describing ways in which AEDPA changed federal habeas law).  
229 See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011) (finding interest in finality 
weighs against introduction of new evidence in federal habeas proceedings); Samuel R. 
Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. REV. 953, 1006 (2012) (observing that 
“federalism, comity, and finality rival, if not eclipse, the vindication of constitutional rights 
as the primary concern of federal habeas”). 
230 Casey, supra note 5, at 104–05. 
231 See, e.g., Milner, supra note 7, at 296. 
232 These techniques were variously used by Texas volunteers Joe Fedelfido Gonzales, 
Steven Renfro, Christopher Jay Swift, Richard Beavers, and James Scott Porter. Joe 
Fedelfido Gonzales pro se Appellant’s Brief in CCA No. 72,253, filed in the TCCA on June 
27, 1996 (at 2 (“During the individual voir dire, I, Joe F. Gonzales, Jr. made statements 
which were true and correct so that I would systematically stack the deck against myself, so I 
would more or less be convicted of the charge, (capital murder), and by not cross examining 
the state’s witnesses nor objecting to direct examination or to the admittance of evidence, 
(by my own judgment and free will), I believe was an asset to the state and an aid to the 
jurors in their answering the special issue questions number one (1) and number two (2) so 
that the death penalty would ultimately be imposed.”); opening argument at 23 (reassuring 
jury that request for death penalty not suicidal); Steven Renfro: District Court No. 96-
0102Xl, Reporter’s Record (RR) 25:3152–54 (Renfro instructed counsel not to cross-
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addition, these arguments ignore the possibility of error by the trial court. 
Prisoners should not be allowed to waive direct appeal, the stage at which 
the trial court’s decisions are reviewed. 
Nor should courts permit prisoners to waive review of possibly 
unconstitutional sentences. “[T]he consent of a convicted defendant in a 
criminal case does not privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise 
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”233 Claims that the would-be 
volunteer should be excluded from the death penalty by virtue of, e.g., his 
intellectual disability or youth at the time of the crime, should be decided 
before the validity of the waiver is adjudicated.234 Finally, in light of 
evidence regarding botched executions,235 litigation regarding the procedure 
used to kill should also not be waivable. There is a “strong societal interest 
in the ban on cruel and unusual punishments that should not be waived by 
one individual,” as such a waiver would essentially “deprive the Eighth 
Amendment of meaning.”236 Therefore, under the regime this Article 
proposes, prisoners’ burden to demonstrate an entitlement to expedited 
execution would decrease as appeals progressed. However, regardless of the 
stage of appeals, the prisoner could not waive appeals regarding the method 
of execution or whether the prisoner falls within a category of offenders 
excluded from execution.  
2. The Integrity of the Legal Profession 
Physicians’ conflicts with hastening death have sometimes been 
reconciled by reference to the importance of recognizing the importance of 
autonomy in a therapeutic relationship.237 The more profound question 
 
examine witness); RR 28:3664 (Renfro tells jury his crime deserved the death penalty); 
Christopher Swift, District Court No. F-2003-1720-C, RR 35:33–34 (confirming on the 
record he does not want any mitigating evidence presented at punishment phase); Richard 
Beavers, District Ct No. 465138, RR 21: 269–71 (Beavers waives right to cross-examine 
surviving victim); James Scott Porter, District Court No. 00-F-0441-202, RR 5:29-30 (Porter 
limited defense counsel’s ability to present certain defenses, to contact mitigation witnesses, 
and to present any witnesses on his behalf).  
233 Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). 
234 See also Blume, supra note 6, at 977–78.  
235 See, e.g., Katie Fretland, Clayton Lockett Writhed and Groaned. After 43 Minutes, He 
Was Declared Dead, GUARDIAN (April 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
apr/30/clayton-lockett-oklahoma-execution-witness, archived at http://perma.cc/LGF7-
F2KT; Michael Kiefer, Arizona Officials Deny Execution Was Botched, ARIZ. REPUBLIC 
(July 25, 2014), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/politics/2014/07/25/arizona-
officials-deny-execution-botched/13145329/, archived at http://perma.cc/W577-FPA9.  
236 Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let’s Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by 
Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV. 615, 642 (2000). 
237 See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 
426–27 (1977). 
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physicians have raised is whether their role in hastening death transforms 
the image of the profession or even changes the profession itself.238 Critics 
of assisted death voice concern that doctors may become more engaged 
with helping patients die than with alleviating their pain or addressing their 
depression.239  
Similar questions are worth asking in the context of legal 
representation. What aspects of the attorney’s role or the attorney–client 
relationship may be enhanced or degraded by enabling a client’s death? 
Some may fear that an attorney’s refusal to follow his client’s order to 
hasten his execution undermines a core professional value. Others may 
believe that by asserting the importance of pursuing appeals, they uphold a 
system that metes out punishment in a lawful, orderly way. They also fulfill 
another mission—to show their clients that their lives have value and that 
they are entitled to the protections of due process. 
A larger concern is that a lawyer’s experience of helping a client die 
could change future approaches to representation by that individual attorney 
or within that legal community. The experience could, e.g., erode the 
attorney’s or the profession’s commitment to enhancing the reliability and 
integrity of the capital conviction and death sentence through a thorough 
investigation. 
When confronted with a volunteer, the court should examine whether 
counsel has performed the investigation outlined by the American Bar 
Association’s Guidelines.240 While not limited to these questions, the 
investigation is particularly important as it pertains to issues directly related 
to the appropriateness of the death sentence, i.e., whether the prisoner is 
excluded from the death penalty because of his juvenile status at the time of 
the crime or his intellectual disability, and whether he is “innocent of the 
death penalty,” i.e., his crime did not constitute capital murder. Where the 
proportionality of the sentence is legally relevant, the investigation must 
 
238 See, e.g., HILLYARD & DOMBRINK, supra note 130, at 37, 45, 90–91, 129–30, 139.  
239 Id. at 181–82 (American Medical Association President expressing concern that 
physician-assisted death “would . . . discourage the kind of appropriate aggressive palliative 
care that can dissuade patients in pain from seeking just such an early death. Recent 
promising developments . . . could be set back dramatically”). Author and physician Atul 
Gawande recently described the planned assisted death of a woman with terminal brain 
cancer as “a sign that our health care system has failed her, because she cannot trust that 
medical personnel are going to recognize her priority of not suffering and be willing to offer 
sufficient care and therapy.” FRONTLINE, Brittany Maynard: Symbol of a Broken Health 
Care System? | FRONTLINE, YOUTUBE (Oct. 17, 2014), http://youtu.be/nIvZtd1nEzE?
t=1m41s, archived at http://perma.cc/A7GW-22Z7. These physicians fear that not only have 
individual doctors possibly failed their patients by not meeting their needs, but that the 
profession as a whole may fail to commit to making good palliative care a priority.  
240 American Bar Association, supra note 107, at 1015–27.  
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also be adequate to provide courts with the evidence required to perform 
their statutory duty.241 This inquiry would be analogous to asking a 
physician whether she had performed the tests necessary to reach an 
accurate diagnosis of the patient’s condition. 
3. Counsel Must Be Appointed to Represent the Range of State Interests 
Judicial inquiry into counsel’s investigation is essential, but the 
professional tension volunteers’ lawyers experience would be substantially 
resolved by appointing counsel to represent the prisoner and different 
counsel to argue for the state’s interests in rejecting the prisoner’s waiver. 
Certainly the lackluster litigation in the Texas volunteer cases suggests such 
appointment of counsel is essential.242 In a few volunteer cases, courts have 
appointed counsel (or asserted counsel should have been appointed) to 
present the case for the incompetence or involuntariness of the waiver.243 
When capital defendants have refused to permit the presentation of 
mitigating evidence, some courts have allowed or required other 
participants to provide mitigating evidence.244 A similar mechanism should 
be used in presenting the case for the state’s interests in the broader inquiry 
 
241 See cases cited supra note 13 (outlining scope of mandatory review).  
242 Rountree, Accounts, supra note 8, at 609–12. 
243 Mason ex rel. Marson v. Vasquez, 5 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the 
district court had ordered counsel to remain prisoner’s court-appointed attorney until his 
mental competence was determined); Comer v. Stewart, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019–20 (D. 
Ariz. 2002) (noting that the court had ordered habeas counsel to present evidence that 
prisoner’s waiver was incompetent and involuntary, and that it had appointed separate 
counsel to represent prisoner in his effort to waive his appeals); State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 
141–42 (Conn. 2005) (appointing counsel to present case against prisoner’s waiver, but 
emphasizing unique aspects of case); accord. Tabler v. Stephens, 588 Fed. App’x 297, 311 
(5th Cir. 2014) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“[I]t was ineffective assistance of counsel for them 
to allow Tabler to waive his habeas rights without taking action to test his competency.”), 
vacated, No. 12-70013, 2015 WL 327646, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 2015); Appel v. Horn, 250 
F.3d 203, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Appel’s counsel should have investigated, advocated, or 
otherwise acted to ensure that there was ‘meaningful adversarial testing [of Appel’s 
competency].’”) (internal citations omitted)); O’Rourke v. Endell, 153 F.3d 560, 569 (8th 
Cir. 1998) (“We believe O’Rourke should have been represented by an attorney, either a 
counsel of record or a ‘next friend,’ to argue that he lacked the capacity to waive his 
appeal.”); Newman v. Norris, No. 05-2107, 2008 WL 222689 at *8 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 24, 
2008) (“The position that Petitioner was not competent to waive his rights to counsel and to 
seek post-conviction relief should have been advanced by an attorney, either a counsel of 
record or a ‘next friend.’”).  
244 See Barnes v. State, 29 So.3d 1010, 1022–26 (Fla. 2010) (upholding appointment of 
“mitigation counsel” to assist court where defendant refused to present mitigation evidence); 
Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 523–24 (Fla. 2005) (court required State to present 
parole officer). 
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proposed here.245 By ensuring that the state’s interests are adequately 
litigated, appointed counsel would also alleviate the conflict counsel must 
struggle with in representing a client who seeks execution. 
  
E. STANDARD OF PROOF 
Once the court has considered the evidence and argument regarding 
the state’s interest in preventing suicide, protecting the interests of innocent 
third parties, the reliability and constitutionality of the death sentence and 
execution, and the impact of the execution on other prisoners and prison 
staff, it must determine whether the prisoner has demonstrated by clear and 
convincing evidence that his right to die outweighs the state’s interests. As 
the Supreme Court noted:  
[T]his Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof—clear and convincing 
evidence—when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both 
particularly important and more substantial than mere loss of money . . . .  
We think it self-evident that the interests at stake in the instant proceedings are more 
substantial, both on an individual and societal level, than those involved in a run-of-
the-mill civil dispute. But not only does the standard of proof reflect the importance of 
a particular adjudication, it also serves as a societal judgment about how the risk of 
error should be distributed between the litigants. The more stringent the burden of 
proof a party must bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision. . . 
. An erroneous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of the status quo; the 
possibility of subsequent developments . . . at least create the potential that a wrong 
decision will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An erroneous decision to 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of correction.246 
Here too, of course, a life is at stake, and not simply pecuniary 
interests. In addition, the legitimacy of the death penalty system as a 
whole—our interest “in making sure that the government does not act 
brutally and lawlessly”247—rests on this determination as well. If the court 
finds the prisoner has met his burden to claim a right to assisted death, it 
must then determine—again with the aid of appointed counsel and an 
adversarial process—whether the prisoner has established his waiver of 
appeals is both competent and voluntary.248 
 
245 Strafer, supra note 4, at 908–11, suggests some of the interests I outline here could be 
safeguarded by permitting greater involvement of third parties. Recognizing the difficulties 
many family members experience in understanding the legal system and gaining access to 
counsel, as well as the State’s role in protecting their interests, I would shift the burden to the 
State to ensure its interests are presented to the court.  
246 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (internal punctuation 
and citations omitted). Id. at 283 (internal punctuation and citations omitted). 
247 Althouse, supra note 96, at 1191. 
248 State and federal jurisdictions vary with respect to the burden of proof courts should 
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Justice Scalia, rarely a friend to the death row prisoner, quoted from a 
nineteenth century court opinion in objecting to arguments for a 
fundamental right to die: 
The life of those to whom life has become a burden—of those who are hopelessly 
diseased or fatally wounded—nay, even the lives of criminals condemned to death, 
are under the protection of the law, equally as the lives of those who are in the full 
tide of life’s enjoyment, and anxious to continue to live.249 
In fact, the law does distinguish the “hopelessly diseased” from the 
condemned. Some non-terminal individuals with a higher risk for suicide 
are allowed to obtain the state’s assistance in dying, regardless of the 
interests of third parties, systemic questions about the legitimacy of the 
legal system and legal profession, and the broader state interest in 
protecting life and preventing suicide, even of death row prisoners. The 
invisibility of this disparity in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is 
striking. In Glucksberg, for example, Justice Souter and Justice O’Connor 
asked almost existential questions about how we can know whether a 
decision to die is truly competent, knowing, and voluntary.250 In the 
criminal justice system, these assessments regarding voluntariness and 
competence, far from being too uncertain to hazard, are made routinely. 
Courts assess voluntariness in every plea agreement, and adjudicate the 
competency of tens of thousands of men and women every year.251 In the 
context of the criminal justice system, the fact that the proceedings involve 
desires to hasten death does not alter the calculability of competence. 
The Court is concerned about suicidality and desires to die in one 
setting, but indifferent in another. The Court in Glucksberg was particularly 
concerned by the problem of accurately diagnosing and treating depression, 
and cited empirical data linking depression, mental disorders and desires to 
hasten death.252 The Supreme Court’s sensitivity to suicide in this context 
 
apply in waiver adjudications. See, e.g., Mason ex rel. Marson v. Vasquez, 5 F.3d 1220, 
1225 (9th Cir. 1993) (requiring federal court to find competence by the preponderance of the 
evidence); State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 146 (Conn. 2005) (because trial court’s 
determination based on a preponderance of the evidence standard not clearly erroneous, 
court declined to decide who bore the burden of proof); Reid ex rel. Martiniano v. State, 396 
S.W.3d 478, 516 (Tenn. 2013) (requiring prisoner to demonstrate incompetence by clear and 
convincing evidence). 
249 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
250 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 738 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. 
at 783–84 (Souter, J., concurring).  
251 Maroney, supra note 138, at 1378. 
252 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730–31. 
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contrasts sharply with its death row cases where suicidality and depression 
featured plainly.253 
The Court in Glucksberg was also aware of the problems of social 
marginalization and desires to hasten death. It expressed concern that 
legalizing assisted suicide would expose “vulnerable groups–including the 
poor, the elderly, and disabled persons” to “abuse, neglect, and 
mistakes.”254 It is difficult to imagine, however, a more profoundly 
stigmatized social group than death-sentenced prisoners.255 The concerns 
the Court identifies regarding compromised autonomy and lack of access to 
good medical care apply with full force to prisoners. Underscoring the 
different treatment of prisoners, however, the circuit court in Rumbaugh 
cited the poor mental health care in prison as a reason to permit Rumbaugh 
to waive his appeals: “[Rumbaugh’s] ability to make the life/death choice is 
apparent from his comments . . . that if he thought that meaningful 
treatment were available and if it were offered, he would probably change 
his decision not to appeal.”256 
Gary Gilmore left an unmistakable imprint on the right to hasten death 
accorded death row prisoners, but the continuing power of his example 
reflects that the law of volunteers is dominated by the capital punishment 
 
253 Only Justice Marshall made any reference to Gilmore’s suicide attempt. Gilmore v. 
Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Godinez v. Moran, the 
majority recited a series of violent acts Moran committed, some against others, and then 
against himself. 509 U.S. 389, 394 n. 3 (1993). The majority made no reference to 
depression and literally marginalized Moran’s suicidality by relegating it to a footnote that 
recites the lower court’s reasons for rejecting Moran’s waiver. Id. The dissent discusses 
Moran’s depression and suicidality, and complains that in the majority opinion, “the most 
significant facts are omitted or relegated to footnotes.” Id. at 409, 410, 416–17 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). In Demosthenes v. Baal, the Court mentions the prisoner’s suicide attempts 
only in the context of explaining the evidence before the lower court. 495 U.S. 731, 735–37 
(1990). The dissenting opinion once again offers a larger context for understanding the 
prisoner’s actions. Here the dissenting Justices reveal that Baal  
has been hospitalized for behavioral and mental problems on numerous occasions since he was 
fourteen years old, has attempted suicide on at least four occasions since 1987 [including twice 
in April 1990], and has been diagnosed in the past as a latent schizophrenic, a borderline 
personality, depressed, and as suffering from organic brain syndrome.  
Id. at 740 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
254 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731. 
255 While the stigma associated with their crime and punishment may be a useful form of 
social control and expression of social norms, it is also relevant that death-sentenced 
prisoners tend to be drawn from marginalized groups. Justice Douglas noted in Furman v. 
Georgia: “Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark has said, ‘It is the poor, the sick, the 
ignorant, the powerless and the hated who are executed.’ One searches our chronicles in vain 
for the execution of any member of the affluent strata of this society.” 408 U.S. 238, 251–52 
(1972). 
256 Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 402 (1985). 
202 MEREDITH MARTIN ROUNTREE [Vol. 105 
frame. By not only involving criminal cases, which implicate normative 
ideas of who commits crimes and why, but also the death penalty, with its 
own logics and history, volunteers have developed a right to die 
substantially removed from the wider social and legal debates over 
hastening death. Where this wider discussion has defined the problem as the 
hypermedicalized, debilitating, and painful “bad” death, it has also had to 
contend with powerful social anxieties. The negative history of euthanasia, 
our concern for marginalized, suicidal, and/or vulnerable individuals, and 
fears of a slippery slope that may transform a right to die into a duty to die 
also inform the legal questions courts ask. 
By making legally irrelevant the prisoner’s depression, his 
relationships with loved ones, and the experience of advocating for the 
death of one’s client, the volunteer jurisprudence further marginalizes the 
condemned prisoner. This marginalization, paradoxically through a more 
expansive right, undermines the legitimacy of the legal system generally. In 
addition, as the empirical evidence also makes clear, it also specifically 
threatens the legitimacy of the death penalty by permitting prisoners to 
hasten execution by bypassing adversarial proceedings. To right this 
balance—indeed, to inject a balance—into the legal treatment of volunteers, 
the legal standard for adjudicating death row prisoners’ requests to hasten 
execution should recognize and weigh the full panoply of the state’s 
interests. 
  
 
